Secure data parser method and system

ABSTRACT

The present invention provides a method and system for securing sensitive data from unauthorized access or use. The method and system of the present invention is useful in a wide variety of settings, including commercial settings generally available to the public which may be extremely large or small with respect to the number of users. The method and system of the present invention is also useful in a more private setting, such as with a corporation or governmental agency, as well as between corporation, governmental agencies or any other entity.

REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

[0001] The present application is a continuation-in-part application ofco-pending non-provisional application Ser. No. 09/666,519, filed onSep. 20, 2000, which claims priority benefit under 35 U.S.C. §119(e)from U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/154,734, filed Sep. 20, 1999,entitled “SECURE SITE FOR INTERNET TRANSACTIONS” and from U.S.Provisional Application No. 60/200,396, filed Apr. 27, 2000, entitled“SECURE SITE FOR INTERNET TRANSACTIONS”.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

[0002] 1. Field of the Invention

[0003] The present invention relates in general to a system for securingdata from unauthorized access or use.

[0004] 2. Description of the Related Art

[0005] In today's society, individuals and businesses conduct anever-increasing amount of activities on and over computer systems. Thesecomputer systems, including proprietary and non-proprietary computernetworks, are often storing, archiving, and transmitting all types ofsensitive information. Thus, an ever-increasing need exists for ensuringdata stored and transmitted over these systems cannot be read orotherwise compromised.

[0006] One common solution for securing computer systems is to providelogin and password functionality. However, password management hasproven to be quite costly with a large percentage of help desk callsrelating to password issues. Moreover, passwords provide little securityin that they are generally stored in a file susceptible to inappropriateaccess, through, for example, brute-force attacks.

[0007] Another solution for securing computer systems is to providecryptographic infrastructures. Cryptography, in general, refers toprotecting data by transforming, or encrypting, it into an unreadableformat. Only those who possess the key(s) to the encryption can decryptthe data into a useable format. Cryptography is used to identify users,e.g., authentication, to allow access privileges, e.g., authorization,to create digital certificates and signatures, and the like. One popularcryptography system is a public key system that uses two keys, a publickey known to everyone and a private key known only to the individual orbusiness owner thereof. Generally, the data encrypted with one key isdecrypted with the other and neither key is recreatable from the other.

[0008] Unfortunately, even the foregoing typical public-keycryptographic systems are still highly reliant on the user for security.For example, cryptographic systems issue the private key to the user,for example, through the user's browser. Unsophisticated users thengenerally store the private key on a hard drive accessible to othersthrough an open computer system, such as, for example, the Internet. Onthe other hand, users may choose poor names for files containing theirprivate key, such as, for example, “key.” The result of the foregoingand other acts is to allow the key or keys to be susceptible tocompromise.

[0009] In addition to the foregoing compromises, a user may save his orher private key on a computer system configured with an archiving orbackup system, potentially resulting in copies of the private keytraveling through multiple computer storage devices or other systems.This security breach is often referred to as “key migration.” Similar tokey migration, many applications provide access to a user's private keythrough, at most, simple login and password access. As mentioned in theforegoing, login and password access often does not provide adequatesecurity.

[0010] One solution for increasing the security of the foregoingcryptographic systems is to include biometrics as part of theauthentication or authorization. Biometrics generally include measurablephysical characteristics, such as, for example, finger prints or speechthat can be checked by an automated system, such as, for example,pattern matching or recognition of finger print patterns or speechpatterns. In such systems, a user's biometric and/or keys may be storedon mobile computing devices, such as, for example, a smartcard, laptop,personal digital assistant, or mobile phone, thereby allowing thebiometric or keys to be usable in a mobile environment.

[0011] The foregoing mobile biometric cryptographic system still suffersfrom a variety of drawbacks. For example, the mobile user may lose orbreak the smartcard or portable computing device, thereby having his orher access to potentially important data entirely cut-off.Alternatively, a malicious person may steal the mobile user's smartcardor portable computing device and use it to effectively steal the mobileuser's digital credentials. On the other hand, the portable-computingdevice may be connected to an open system, such as the Internet, and,like passwords, the file where the biometric is stored may besusceptible to compromise through user inattentiveness to security ormalicious intruders.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

[0012] Based on the foregoing, a need exists to provide a cryptographicsystem whose security is user-independent while still supporting mobileusers.

[0013] Accordingly, one aspect of the present invention is to provide amethod for securing virtually any type of data from unauthorized accessor use. The method comprises one or more steps of parsing, splitting orseparating the data to be secured into two or more parts or portions.The method also comprises encrypting the data to be secured. Encryptionof the data may be performed prior to or after the first parsing,splitting or separating of the data. In addition, the encrypting stepmay be repeated for one or more portions of the data. Similarly, theparsing, splitting or separating steps may be repeated for one or moreportions of the data. The method also optionally comprises storing theparsed, split or separated data that has been encrypted in one locationor in multiple locations. This method also optionally comprisesreconstituting or re-assembling the secured data into its original formfor authorized access or use. This method may be incorporated into theoperations of any computer, server, engine or the like, that is capableof executing the desired steps of the method.

[0014] Another aspect of the present invention provides a system forsecuring virtually any type of data from unauthorized access or use.This system comprises a data splitting module, a cryptographic handlingmodule, and, optionally, a data assembly module. The system may, in oneembodiment, further comprise one or more data storage facilities wheresecure data may be stored.

[0015] Accordingly, one aspect of the invention is to provide a secureserver, or trust engine, having server-centric keys, or in other words,storing cryptographic keys and user authentication data on a server.According to this embodiment, a user accesses the trust engine in orderto perform authentication and cryptographic functions, such as, but notlimited to, for example, authentication, authorization, digital signingand generation, storage, and retrieval of certificates, encryption,notary-like and power-of-attorney-like actions, and the like.

[0016] Another aspect of the invention is to provide a reliable, ortrusted, authentication process. Moreover, subsequent to a trustworthypositive authentication, a wide number of differing actions may betaken, from providing cryptographic technology, to system or deviceauthorization and access, to permitting use or control of one or a widenumber of electronic devices.

[0017] Another aspect of the invention is to provide cryptographic keysand authentication data in an environment where they are not lost,stolen, or compromised, thereby advantageously avoiding a need tocontinually reissue and manage new keys and authentication data.According to another aspect of the invention, the trust engine allows auser to use one key pair for multiple activities, vendors, and/orauthentication requests. According to yet another aspect of theinvention, the trust engine performs at least one step of cryptographicprocessing, such as, but not limited to, encrypting, authenticating, orsigning, on the server side, thereby allowing clients or users topossess only minimal computing resources.

[0018] According to yet another aspect of the invention, the trustengine includes one or multiple depositories for storing portions ofeach cryptographic key and authentication data. The portions are createdthrough a data splitting process that prohibits reconstruction without apredetermined portion from more than one location in one depository orfrom multiple depositories. According to another embodiment, themultiple depositories may be geographically remote such that a rogueemployee or otherwise compromised system at one depository will notprovide access to a user's key or authentication data.

[0019] According to yet another embodiment, the authentication processadvantageously allows the trust engine to process multipleauthentication activities in parallel. According to yet anotherembodiment, the trust engine may advantageously track failed accessattempts and thereby limit the number of times malicious intruders mayattempt to subvert the system.

[0020] According to yet another embodiment, the trust engine may includemultiple instantiations where each trust engine may predict and shareprocessing loads with the others. According to yet another embodiment,the trust engine may include a redundancy module for polling a pluralityof authentication results to ensure that more than one systemauthenticates the user.

[0021] Therefore, one aspect of the invention includes a securecryptographic system, which may be remotely accessible, for storing dataof any type, including, but not limited to, a plurality of privatecryptographic keys to be associated with a plurality of users. Thecryptographic system associates each of the plurality of users with oneor more different keys from the plurality of private cryptographic keysand performs cryptographic functions for each user using the associatedone or more different keys without releasing the plurality of privatecryptographic keys to the users. The cryptographic system comprises adepository system having at least one server which stores the data to besecured, such as a plurality of private cryptographic keys and aplurality of enrollment authentication data. Each enrollmentauthentication data identifies one of multiple users and each of themultiple users is associated with one or more different keys from theplurality of private cryptographic keys. The cryptographic system alsomay comprise an authentication engine which compares authentication datareceived by one of the multiple users to enrollment authentication datacorresponding to the one of multiple users and received from thedepository system, thereby producing an authentication result. Thecryptographic system also may comprise a cryptographic engine which,when the authentication result indicates proper identification of theone of the multiple users, performs cryptographic functions on behalf ofthe one of the multiple users using the associated one or more differentkeys received from the depository system. The cryptographic system alsomay comprise a transaction engine connected to route data from themultiple users to the depository server system, the authenticationengine, and the cryptographic engine.

[0022] Another aspect of the invention includes a secure cryptographicsystem that is optionally remotely accessible. The cryptographic systemcomprises a depository system having at least one server which stores atleast one private key and any other data, such as, but not limited to, aplurality of enrollment authentication data, wherein each enrollmentauthentication data identifies one of possibly multiple users. Thecryptographic system may also optionally comprise an authenticationengine which compares authentication data received by users toenrollment authentication data corresponding to the user and receivedfrom the depository system, thereby producing an authentication result.The cryptographic system also comprises a cryptographic engine which,when the authentication result indicates proper identification of theuser, performs cryptographic functions on behalf of the user using atleast said private key, which may be received from the depositorysystem. The cryptographic system may also optionally comprise atransaction engine connected to route data from the users to otherengines or systems such as, but not limited to, the depository serversystem, the authentication engine, and the cryptographic engine.

[0023] Another aspect of the invention includes a method of facilitatingcryptographic functions. The method comprises associating a user frommultiple users with one or more keys from a plurality of privatecryptographic keys stored on a secure location, such as a secure server.The method also comprises receiving authentication data from the user,and comparing the authentication data to authentication datacorresponding to the user, thereby verifying the identity of the user.The method also comprises utilizing the one or more keys to performcryptographic functions without releasing the one or more keys to theuser.

[0024] Another aspect of the invention includes an authentication systemfor uniquely identifying a user through secure storage of the user'senrollment authentication data. The authentication system comprises oneor more data storage facilities, wherein each data storage facilityincludes a computer accessible storage medium which stores at least oneof portions of enrollment authentication data. The authentication systemalso comprises an authentication engine which communicates with the datastorage facility or facilities. The authentication engine comprises adata splitting module which operates on the enrollment authenticationdata to create portions, a data assembling module which processes theportions from at least one of the data storage facilities to assemblethe enrollment authentication data, and a data comparator module whichreceives current authentication data from a user and compares thecurrent authentication data with the assembled enrollment authenticationdata to determine whether the user has been uniquely identified.

[0025] Another aspect of the invention includes a cryptographic system.The cryptographic system comprises one or more data storage facilities,wherein each data storage facility includes a computer accessiblestorage medium which stores at least one portion of one ore morecryptographic keys. The cryptographic system also comprises acryptographic engine which communicates with the data storagefacilities. The cryptographic engine also comprises a data splittingmodule which operate on the cryptographic keys to create portions, adata assembling module which processes the portions from at least one ofthe data storage facilities to assemble the cryptographic keys, and acryptographic handling module which receives the assembled cryptographickeys and performs cryptographic functions therewith.

[0026] Another aspect of the invention includes a method of storing anytype of data, including, but not limited to, authentication data ingeographically remote secure data storage facilities thereby protectingthe data against composition of any individual data storage facility.The method comprises receiving data at a trust engine, combining at thetrust engine the data with a first substantially random value to form afirst combined value, and combining the data with a second substantiallyrandom value to form a second combined value. The method comprisescreating a first pairing of the first substantially random value withthe second combined value, creating a second pairing of the firstsubstantially random value with the second substantially random value,and storing the first pairing in a first secure data storage facility.The method comprises storing the second pairing in a second secure datastorage facility remote from the first secure data storage facility.

[0027] Another aspect of the invention includes a method of storing anytype of data, including, but not limited to, authentication datacomprising receiving data, combining the data with a first set of bitsto form a second set of bits, and combining the data with a third set ofbits to form a fourth set of bits. The method also comprises creating afirst pairing of the first set of bits with the third set of bits. Themethod also comprises creating a second pairing of the first set of bitswith the fourth set of bits, and storing one of the first and secondpairings in a first computer accessible storage medium. The method alsocomprises storing the other of the first and second pairings in a secondcomputer accessible storage medium.

[0028] Another aspect of the invention includes a method of storingcryptographic data in geographically remote secure data storagefacilities thereby protecting the cryptographic data against comprise ofany individual data storage facility. The method comprises receivingcryptographic data at a trust engine, combining at the trust engine thecryptographic data with a first substantially random value to form afirst combined value, and combining the cryptographic data with a secondsubstantially random value to form a second combined value. The methodalso comprises creating a first pairing of the first substantiallyrandom value with the second combined value, creating a second pairingof the first substantially random value with the second substantiallyrandom value, and storing the first pairing in a first secure datastorage facility. The method also comprises storing the second pairingin a secure second data storage facility remote from the first securedata storage facility.

[0029] Another aspect of the invention includes a method of storingcryptographic data comprising receiving authentication data andcombining the cryptographic data with a first set of bits to form asecond set of bits. The method also comprises combining thecryptographic data with a third set of bits to form a fourth set ofbits, creating a first pairing of the first set of bits with the thirdset of bits, and creating a second pairing of the first set of bits withthe fourth set of bits. The method also comprises storing one of thefirst and second pairings in a first computer accessible storage medium,and storing the other of the first and second pairings in a secondcomputer accessible storage medium.

[0030] Another aspect of the invention includes a method of handlingsensitive data of any type or form in a cryptographic system, whereinthe sensitive data exists in a useable form only during actions byauthorized users, employing the sensitive data. The method alsocomprises receiving in a software module, substantially randomized orencrypted sensitive data from a first computer accessible storagemedium, and receiving in the software module, substantially randomizedor encrypted data which may or may not be sensitive data, from one ormore other computer accessible storage medium. The method also comprisesprocessing the substantially randomized pre-encrypted sensitive data andthe substantially randomized or encrypted data which may or may not besensitive data, in the software module to assemble the sensitive dataand employing the sensitive data in a software engine to perform anaction. The action includes, but is not limited to, one ofauthenticating a user and performing a cryptographic function.

[0031] Another aspect of the invention includes a secure authenticationsystem. The secure authentication system comprises a plurality ofauthentication engines. Each authentication engine receives enrollmentauthentication data designed to uniquely identify a user to a degree ofcertainty. Each authentication engine receives current authenticationdata to compare to the enrollment authentication data, and eachauthentication engine determines an authentication result. The secureauthentication system also comprises a redundancy system which receivesthe authentication result of at least two of the authentication enginesand determines whether the user has been uniquely identified.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0032] The present invention is described in more detail below inconnection with the attached drawings, which are meant to illustrate andnot to limit the invention, and in which:

[0033]FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of a cryptographic system,according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0034]FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram of the trust engine of FIG. 1,according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0035]FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram of the transaction engine ofFIG. 2, according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0036]FIG. 4 illustrates a block diagram of the depository of FIG. 2,according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0037]FIG. 5 illustrates a block diagram of the authentication engine ofFIG. 2, according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0038]FIG. 6 illustrates a block diagram of the cryptographic engine ofFIG. 2, according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0039]FIG. 7 illustrates a block diagram of a depository system,according to aspects of another embodiment of the invention;

[0040]FIG. 8 illustrates a flow chart of a data splitting processaccording to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0041]FIG. 9, Panel A illustrates a data flow of an enrollment processaccording to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0042]FIG. 9, Panel B illustrates a flow chart of an interoperabilityprocess according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0043]FIG. 10 illustrates a data flow of an authentication processaccording to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0044]FIG. 11 illustrates a data flow of a signing process according toaspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0045]FIG. 12 illustrates a data flow and an encryption/decryptionprocess according to aspects and yet another embodiment of theinvention;

[0046]FIG. 13 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a trust enginesystem according to aspects of another embodiment of the invention;

[0047]FIG. 14 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a trust enginesystem according to aspects of another embodiment of the invention;

[0048]FIG. 15 illustrates a block diagram of the redundancy module ofFIG. 14, according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

[0049]FIG. 16 illustrates a process for evaluating authenticationsaccording to one aspect of the invention;

[0050]FIG. 17 illustrates a process for assigning a value to anauthentication according to one aspect as shown in FIG. 16 of theinvention;

[0051]FIG. 18 illustrates a process for performing trust arbitrage in anaspect of the invention as shown in FIG. 17; and

[0052]FIG. 19 illustrates a sample transaction between a user and avendor according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention where aninitial web based contact leads to a sales contract signed by bothparties.

[0053]FIG. 20 illustrates a sample user system with a cryptographicservice provider module which provides security functions to a usersystem.

[0054]FIG. 21 illustrates a process for parsing, splitting or separatingdata with encryption and storage of the encryption master key with thedata.

[0055]FIG. 22 illustrates a process for parsing, splitting or separatingdata with encryption and storing the encryption master key separatelyfrom the data.

[0056]FIG. 23 illustrates the intermediary key process for parsing,splitting or separating data with encryption and storage of theencryption master key with the data.

[0057]FIG. 24 illustrates the intermediary key process for parsing,splitting or separating data with encryption and storing the encryptionmaster key separately from the data.

[0058]FIG. 25 illustrates utilization of the cryptographic methods andsystems of the present invention with a small working group.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

[0059] One aspect of the present invention is to provide a cryptographicsystem where one or more secure servers, or a trust engine, storescryptographic keys and user authentication data. Users access thefunctionality of conventional cryptographic systems through networkaccess to the trust engine, however, the trust engine does not releaseactual keys and other authentication data and therefore, the keys anddata remain secure. This server-centric storage of keys andauthentication data provides for user-independent security, portability,availability, and straightforwardness.

[0060] Because users can be confident in, or trust, the cryptographicsystem to perform user and document authentication and othercryptographic functions, a wide variety of functionality may beincorporated into the system. For example, the trust engine provider canensure against agreement repudiation by, for example, authenticating theagreement participants, digitally signing the agreement on behalf of orfor the participants, and storing a record of the agreement digitallysigned by each participant. In addition, the cryptographic system maymonitor agreements and determine to apply varying degrees ofauthentication, based on, for example, price, user, vendor, geographiclocation, place of use, or the like.

[0061] To facilitate a complete understanding of the invention, theremainder of the detailed description describes the invention withreference to the figures, wherein like elements are referenced with likenumerals throughout.

[0062]FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of a cryptographic system 100,according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG.1, the cryptographic system 100 includes a user system 105, a trustengine 110, a certificate authority 115, and a vendor system 120,communicating through a communication link 125.

[0063] According to one embodiment of the invention, the user system 105comprises a conventional general-purpose computer having one or moremicroprocessors, such as, for example, an Intel-based processor.Moreover, the user system 105 includes an appropriate operating system,such as, for example, an operating system capable of including graphicsor windows, such as Windows, Unix, Linux, or the like. As shown in FIG.1, the user system 105 may include a biometric device 107. The biometricdevice 107 may advantageously capture a user's biometric and transferthe captured biometric to the trust engine 110. According to oneembodiment of the invention, the biometric device may advantageouslycomprise a device having attributes and features similar to thosedisclosed in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/926,277, filed on Sep.5, 1997, entitled “RELIEF OBJECT IMAGE GENERATOR,” U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 09/558,634, filed on Apr. 26, 2000, entitled“IMAGING DEVICE FOR A RELIEF OBJECT AND SYSTEM AND METHOD OF USING THEIMAGE DEVICE, ” U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/435,011, filed onNov. 5, 1999, entitled “RELIEF OBJECT SENSOR ADAPTOR, ” and U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 09/477,943, filed on Jan. 5, 2000, entitled “PLANAROPTICAL IMAGE SENSOR AND SYSTEM FOR GENERATING AN ELECTRONIC IMAGE OF ARELIEF OBJECT FOR FINGERPRINT READING,” all of which are owned by theinstant assignee, and all of which are hereby incorporated by referenceherein.

[0064] In addition, the user system 105 may connect to the communicationlink 125 through a conventional service provider, such as, for example,a dial up, digital subscriber line (DSL), cable modem, fiber connection,or the like. According to another embodiment, the user system 105connects the communication link 125 through network connectivity suchas, for example, a local or wide area network. According to oneembodiment, the operating system includes a TCP/IP stack that handlesall incoming and outgoing message traffic passed over the communicationlink 125.

[0065] Although the user system 105 is disclosed with reference to theforegoing embodiments, the invention is not intended to be limitedthereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosureherein, a wide number of alternatives embodiments of the user system105, including almost any computing device capable of sending orreceiving information from another computer system. For example, theuser system 105 may include, but is not limited to, a computerworkstation, an interactive television, an interactive kiosk, a personalmobile computing device, such as a digital assistant, mobile phone,laptop, or the like, a wireless communications device, a smartcard, anembedded computing device, or the like, which can interact with thecommunication link 125. In such alternative systems, the operatingsystems will likely differ and be adapted for the particular device.However, according to one embodiment, the operating systemsadvantageously continue to provide the appropriate communicationsprotocols needed to establish communication with the communication link125.

[0066]FIG. 1 illustrates the trust engine 110. According to oneembodiment, the trust engine 110 comprises one or more secure serversfor accessing and storing sensitive information, which may be any typeor form of data, such as, but not limited to text, audio, video, userauthentication data and public and private cryptographic keys. Accordingto one embodiment, the authentication data includes data designed touniquely identify a user of the cryptographic system 100. For example,the authentication data may include a user identification number, one ormore biometrics, and a series of questions and answers generated by thetrust engine 110 or the user, but answered initially by the user atenrollment. The foregoing questions may include demographic data, suchas place of birth, address, anniversary, or the like, personal data,such as mother's maiden name, favorite ice cream, or the like, or otherdata designed to uniquely identify the user. The trust engine 110compares a user's authentication data associated with a currenttransaction, to the authentication data provided at an earlier time,such as, for example, during enrollment. The trust engine 110 mayadvantageously require the user to produce the authentication data atthe time of each transaction, or, the trust engine 110 mayadvantageously allow the user to periodically produce authenticationdata, such as at the beginning of a string of transactions or thelogging onto a particular vendor website.

[0067] According to the embodiment where the user produces biometricdata, the user provides a physical characteristic, such as, but notlimited to, facial scan, hand scan, ear scan, iris scan, retinal scan,vascular pattern, DNA, a fingerprint, writing or speech, to thebiometric device 107. The biometric device advantageously produces anelectronic pattern, or biometric, of the physical characteristic. Theelectronic pattern is transferred through the user system 105 to thetrust engine 110 for either enrollment or authentication purposes.

[0068] Once the user produces the appropriate authentication data andthe trust engine 110 determines a positive match between thatauthentication data (current authentication data) and the authenticationdata provided at the time of enrollment (enrollment authenticationdata), the trust engine 110 provides the user with completecryptographic functionality. For example, the properly authenticateduser may advantageously employ the trust engine 110 to perform hashing,digitally signing, encrypting and decrypting (often together referred toonly as encrypting), creating or distributing digital certificates, andthe like. However, the private cryptographic keys used in thecryptographic functions will not be available outside the trust engine110, thereby ensuring the integrity of the cryptographic keys.

[0069] According to one embodiment, the trust engine 110 generates andstores cryptographic keys. According to another embodiment, at least onecryptographic key is associated with each user. Moreover, when thecryptographic keys include public-key technology, each private keyassociated with a user is generated within, and not released from, thetrust engine 110. Thus, so long as the user has access to the trustengine 110, the user may perform cryptographic functions using his orher private or public key. Such remote access advantageously allowsusers to remain completely mobile and access cryptographic functionalitythrough practically any Internet connection, such as cellular andsatellite phones, kiosks, laptops, hotel rooms and the like.

[0070] According to another embodiment, the trust engine 110 performsthe cryptographic functionality using a key pair generated for the trustengine 110. According to this embodiment, the trust engine 110 firstauthenticates the user, and after the user has properly producedauthentication data matching the enrollment authentication data, thetrust engine 110 uses its own cryptographic key pair to performcryptographic functions on behalf of the authenticated user.

[0071] A skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure herein thatthe cryptographic keys may advantageously include some or all ofsymmetric keys, public keys, and private keys. In addition, a skilledartisan will recognize from the disclosure herein that the foregoingkeys may be implemented with a wide number of algorithms available fromcommercial technologies, such as, for example, RSA, ELGAMAL, or thelike.

[0072]FIG. 1 also illustrates the certificate authority 115. Accordingto one embodiment, the certificate authority 115 may advantageouslycomprise a trusted third-party organization or company that issuesdigital certificates, such as, for example, VeriSign, Baltimore,Entrust, or the like. The trust engine 110 may advantageously transmitrequests for digital certificates, through one or more conventionaldigital certificate protocols, such as, for example, PKCS10, to thecertificate authority 115. In response, the certificate authority 115will issue a digital certificate in one or more of a number of differingprotocols, such as, for example, PKCS7. According to one embodiment ofthe invention, the trust engine 110 requests digital certificates fromseveral or all of the prominent certificate authorities 115 such thatthe trust engine 110 has access to a digital certificate correspondingto the certificate standard of any requesting party.

[0073] According to another embodiment, the trust engine 110 internallyperforms certificate issuances. In this embodiment, the trust engine 10may access a certificate system for generating certificates and/or mayinternally generate certificates when they are requested, such as, forexample, at the time of key generation or in the certificate standardrequested at the time of the request. The trust engine 110 will bedisclosed in greater detail below.

[0074]FIG. 1 also illustrates the vendor system 120. According to oneembodiment, the vendor system 120 advantageously comprises a Web server.Typical Web servers generally serve content over the Internet using oneof several internet markup languages or document format standards, suchas the Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML) or the Extensible MarkupLanguage (XML). The Web server accepts requests from browsers likeNetscape and Internet Explorer and then returns the appropriateelectronic documents. A number of server or client-side technologies canbe used to increase the power of the Web server beyond its ability todeliver standard electronic documents. For example, these technologiesinclude Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts, Secure Sockets Layer(SSL) security, and Active Server Pages (ASPs). The vendor system 120may advantageously provide electronic content relating to commercial,personal, educational, or other transactions.

[0075] Although the vendor system 120 is disclosed with reference to theforegoing embodiments, the invention is not intended to be limitedthereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosureherein that the vendor system 120 may advantageously comprise any of thedevices described with reference to the user system 105 or combinationthereof.

[0076]FIG. 1 also illustrates the communication link 125 connecting theuser system 105, the trust engine 110, the certificate authority 115,and the vendor system 120. According to one embodiment, thecommunication link 125 preferably comprises the Internet. The Internet,as used throughout this disclosure is a global network of computers. Thestructure of the Internet, which is well known to those of ordinaryskill in the art, includes a network backbone with networks branchingfrom the backbone. These branches, in turn, have networks branching fromthem, and so on. Routers move information packets between networklevels, and then from network to network, until the packet reaches theneighborhood of its destination. From the destination, the destinationnetwork's host directs the information packet to the appropriateterminal, or node. In one advantageous embodiment, the Internet routinghubs comprise domain name system (DNS) servers using TransmissionControl Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) as is well known in the art.The routing hubs connect to one or more other routing hubs viahigh-speed communication links.

[0077] One popular part of the Internet is the World Wide Web. The WorldWide Web contains different computers, which store documents capable ofdisplaying graphical and textual information. The computers that provideinformation on the World Wide Web are typically called “websites.” Awebsite is defined by an Internet address that has an associatedelectronic page. The electronic page can be identified by a UniformResource Locator (URL). Generally, an electronic page is a document thatorganizes the presentation of text, graphical images, audio, video, andso forth.

[0078] Although the communication link 125 is disclosed in terms of itspreferred embodiment, one of ordinary skill in the art will recognizefrom the disclosure herein that the communication link 125 may include awide range of interactive communications links. For example, thecommunication link 125 may include interactive television networks,telephone networks, wireless data transmission systems, two-way cablesystems, customized private or public computer networks, interactivekiosk networks, automatic teller machine networks, direct links,satellite or cellular networks, and the like.

[0079]FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram of the trust engine 110 of FIG.1 according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown inFIG. 2, the trust engine 110 includes a transaction engine 205, adepository 210, an authentication engine 215, and a cryptographic engine220. According to one embodiment of the invention, the trust engine 110also includes mass storage 225. As further shown in FIG. 2, thetransaction engine 205 communicates with the depository 210, theauthentication engine 215, and the cryptographic engine 220, along withthe mass storage 225. In addition, the depository 210 communicates withthe authentication engine 215, the cryptographic engine 220, and themass storage 225. Moreover, the authentication engine 215 communicateswith the cryptographic engine 220. According to one embodiment of theinvention, some, or all of the foregoing communications mayadvantageously comprise the transmission of XML documents to IPaddresses that correspond to the receiving device. As mentioned in theforegoing, XML documents advantageously allow designers to create theirown customized document tags, enabling the definition, transmission,validation, and interpretation of data between applications and betweenorganizations. Moreover, some or all of the foregoing communications mayinclude conventional SSL technologies.

[0080] According to one embodiment, the transaction engine 205 comprisesa data routing device, such as a conventional Web server available fromNetscape, Microsoft, Apache, or the like. For example, the Web servermay advantageously receive incoming data from the communication link125. According to one embodiment of the invention, the incoming data isaddressed to a front-end security system for the trust engine 110. Forexample, the front-end security system may advantageously include afirewall, an intrusion detection system searching for known attackprofiles, and/or a virus scanner. After clearing the front-end securitysystem, the data is received by the transaction engine 205 and routed toone of the depository 210, the authentication engine 215, thecryptographic engine 220, and the mass storage 225. In addition, thetransaction engine 205 monitors incoming data from the authenticationengine 215 and cryptographic engine 220, and routes the data toparticular systems through the communication link 125. For example, thetransaction engine 205 may advantageously route data to the user system105, the certificate authority 115, or the vendor system 120.

[0081] According to one embodiment, the data is routed usingconventional HTTP routing techniques, such as, for example, employingURLs or Uniform Resource Indicators (URIs). URIs are similar to URLs,however, URIs typically indicate the source of files or actions, suchas, for example, executables, scripts, and the like. Therefore,according to the one embodiment, the user system 105, the certificateauthority 115, the vendor system 120, and the components of the trustengine 210, advantageously include sufficient data within communicationURLs or URIs for the transaction engine 205 to properly route datathroughout the cryptographic system.

[0082] Although the data routing is disclosed with reference to itspreferred embodiment, a skilled artisan will recognize a wide number ofpossible data routing solutions or strategies. For example, XML or otherdata packets may advantageously be unpacked and recognized by theirformat, content, or the like, such that the transaction engine 205 mayproperly route data throughout the trust engine 110. Moreover, a skilledartisan will recognize that the data routing may advantageously beadapted to the data transfer protocols conforming to particular networksystems, such as, for example, when the communication link 125 comprisesa local network.

[0083] According to yet another embodiment of the invention, thetransaction engine 205 includes conventional SSL encryptiontechnologies, such that the foregoing systems may authenticatethemselves, and vise-versa, with transaction engine 205, duringparticular communications. As will be used throughout this disclosure,the term “½ SSL” refers to communications where a server but notnecessarily the client, is SSL authenticated, and the term “FULL SSL”refers to communications where the client and the server are SSLauthenticated. When the instant disclosure uses the term “SSL”, thecommunication may comprise ½ or FULL SSL.

[0084] As the transaction engine 205 routes data to the variouscomponents of the cryptographic system 100, the transaction engine 205may advantageously create an audit trail. According to one embodiment,the audit trail includes a record of at least the type and format ofdata routed by the transaction engine 205 throughout the cryptographicsystem 100. Such audit data may advantageously be stored in the massstorage 225.

[0085]FIG. 2 also illustrates the depository 210. According to oneembodiment, the depository 210 comprises one or more data storagefacilities, such as, for example, a directory server, a database server,or the like. As shown in FIG. 2, the depository 210 stores cryptographickeys and enrollment authentication data. The cryptographic keys mayadvantageously correspond to the trust engine 110 or to users of thecryptographic system 100, such as the user or vendor. The enrollmentauthentication data may advantageously include data designed to uniquelyidentify a user, such as, user ID, passwords, answers to questions,biometric data, or the like. This enrollment authentication data mayadvantageously be acquired at enrollment of a user or anotheralternative later time. For example, the trust engine 110 may includeperiodic or other renewal or reissue of enrollment authentication data.

[0086] According to one embodiment, the communication from thetransaction engine 205 to and from the authentication engine 215 and thecryptographic engine 220 comprises secure communication, such as, forexample conventional SSL technology. In addition, as mentioned in theforegoing, the data of the communications to and from the depository 210may be transferred using URLs, URIs, HTTP or XML documents, with any ofthe foregoing advantageously having data requests and formats embeddedtherein.

[0087] As mentioned above, the depository 210 may advantageouslycomprises a plurality of secure data storage facilities. In such anembodiment, the secure data storage facilities may be configured suchthat a compromise of the security in one individual data storagefacility will not compromise the cryptographic keys or theauthentication data stored therein. For example, according to thisembodiment, the cryptographic keys and the authentication data aremathematically operated on so as to statistically and substantiallyrandomize the data stored in each data storage facility. According toone embodiment, the randomization of the data of an individual datastorage facility renders that data undecipherable. Thus, compromise ofan individual data storage facility produces only a randomizedundecipherable number and does not compromise the security of anycryptographic keys or the authentication data as a whole.

[0088]FIG. 2 also illustrates the trust engine 110 including theauthentication engine 215. According to one embodiment, theauthentication engine 215 comprises a data comparator configured tocompare data from the transaction engine 205 with data from thedepository 210. For example, during authentication, a user suppliescurrent authentication data to the trust engine 110 such that thetransaction engine 205 receives the current authentication data. Asmentioned in the foregoing, the transaction engine 205 recognizes thedata requests, preferably in the URL or URI, and routes theauthentication data to the authentication engine 215. Moreover, uponrequest, the depository 210 forwards enrollment authentication datacorresponding to the user to the authentication engine 215. Thus, theauthentication engine 215 has both the current authentication data andthe enrollment authentication data for comparison.

[0089] According to one embodiment, the communications to theauthentication engine comprise secure communications, such as, forexample, SSL technology. Additionally, security can be provided withinthe trust engine 110 components, such as, for example, super-encryptionusing public key technologies. For example, according to one embodiment,the user encrypts the current authentication data with the public key ofthe authentication engine 215. In addition, the depository 210 alsoencrypts the enrollment authentication data with the public key of theauthentication engine 215. In this way, only the authentication engine'sprivate key can be used to decrypt the transmissions.

[0090] As shown in FIG. 2, the trust engine 110 also includes thecryptographic engine 220. According to one embodiment, the cryptographicengine comprises a cryptographic handling module, configured toadvantageously provide conventional cryptographic functions, such as,for example, public-key infrastructure (PKI) functionality. For example,the cryptographic engine 220 may advantageously issue public and privatekeys for users of the cryptographic system 100. In this manner, thecryptographic keys are generated at the cryptographic engine 220 andforwarded to the depository 210 such that at least the privatecryptographic keys are not available outside of the trust engine 110.According to another embodiment, the cryptographic engine 220 randomizesand splits at least the private cryptographic key data, thereby storingonly the randomized split data. Similar to the splitting of theenrollment authentication data, the splitting process ensures the storedkeys are not available outside the cryptographic engine 220. Accordingto another embodiment, the functions of the cryptographic engine can becombined with and performed by the authentication engine 215.

[0091] According to one embodiment, communications to and from thecryptographic engine include secure communications, such as SSLtechnology. In addition, XML documents may advantageously be employed totransfer data and/or make cryptographic function requests.

[0092]FIG. 2 also illustrates the trust engine 110 having the massstorage 225. As mentioned in the foregoing, the transaction engine 205keeps data corresponding to an audit trail and stores such data in themass storage 225. Similarly, according to one embodiment of theinvention, the depository 210 keeps data corresponding to an audit trailand stores such data in the mass storage device 225. The depositoryaudit trail data is similar to that of the transaction engine 205 inthat the audit trail data comprises a record of the requests received bythe depository 210 and the response thereof. In addition, the massstorage 225 may be used to store digital certificates having the publickey of a user contained therein.

[0093] Although the trust engine 110 is disclosed with reference to itspreferred and alternative embodiments, the invention is not intended tobe limited thereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize in thedisclosure herein, a wide number of alternatives for the trust engine110. For example, the trust engine 110, may advantageously perform onlyauthentication, or alternatively, only some or all of the cryptographicfunctions, such as data encryption and decryption. According to suchembodiments, one of the authentication engine 215 and the cryptographicengine 220 may advantageously be removed, thereby creating a morestraightforward design for the trust engine 110. In addition, thecryptographic engine 220 may also communicate with a certificateauthority such that the certificate authority is embodied within thetrust engine 110. According to yet another embodiment, the trust engine110 may advantageously perform authentication and one or morecryptographic functions, such as, for example, digital signing.

[0094]FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram of the transaction engine 205of FIG. 2, according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention.According to this embodiment, the transaction engine 205 comprises anoperating system 305 having a handling thread and a listening thread.The operating system 305 may advantageously be similar to those found inconventional high volume servers, such as, for example, Web serversavailable from Apache. The listening thread monitors the incomingcommunication from one of the communication link 125, the authenticationengine 215, and the cryptographic engine 220 for incoming data flow. Thehandling thread recognizes particular data structures of the incomingdata flow, such as, for example, the foregoing data structures, therebyrouting the incoming data to one of the communication link 125, thedepository 210, the authentication engine 215, the cryptographic engine220, or the mass storage 225. As shown in FIG. 3, the incoming andoutgoing data may advantageously be secured through, for example, SSLtechnology.

[0095]FIG. 4 illustrates a block diagram of the depository 210 of FIG. 2according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. According tothis embodiment, the depository 210 comprises one or more lightweightdirectory access protocol (LDAP) servers. LDAP directory servers areavailable from a wide variety of manufacturers such as Netscape, ISO,and others. FIG. 4 also shows that the directory server preferablystores data 405 corresponding to the cryptographic keys and data 410corresponding to the enrollment authentication data. According to oneembodiment, the depository 210 comprises a single logical memorystructure indexing authentication data and cryptographic key data to aunique user ID. The single logical memory structure preferably includesmechanisms to ensure a high degree of trust, or security, in the datastored therein. For example, the physical location of the depository 210may advantageously include a wide number of conventional securitymeasures, such as limited employee access, modern surveillance systems,and the like. In addition to, or in lieu of, the physical securities,the computer system or server may advantageously include softwaresolutions to protect the stored data. For example, the depository 210may advantageously create and store data 415 corresponding to an audittrail of actions taken. In addition, the incoming and outgoingcommunications may advantageously be encrypted with public keyencryption coupled with conventional SSL technologies.

[0096] According to another embodiment, the depository 210 may comprisedistinct and physically separated data storage facilities, as disclosedfurther with reference to FIG. 7.

[0097]FIG. 5 illustrates a block diagram of the authentication engine215 of FIG. 2 according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention.Similar to the transaction engine 205 of FIG. 3, the authenticationengine 215 comprises an operating system 505 having at least a listeningand a handling thread of a modified version of a conventional Webserver, such as, for example, Web servers available from Apache. Asshown in FIG. 5, the authentication engine 215 includes access to atleast one private key 510. The private key 510 may advantageously beused for example, to decrypt data from the transaction engine 205 or thedepository 210, which was encrypted with a corresponding public key ofthe authentication engine 215.

[0098]FIG. 5 also illustrates the authentication engine 215 comprising acomparator 515, a data splitting module 520, and a data assemblingmodule 525. According to the preferred embodiment of the invention, thecomparator 515 includes technology capable of comparing potentiallycomplex patterns related to the foregoing biometric authentication data.The technology may include hardware, software, or combined solutions forpattern comparisons, such as, for example, those representing fingerprint patterns or voice patterns. In addition, according to oneembodiment, the comparator 515 of the authentication engine 215 mayadvantageously compare conventional hashes of documents in order torender a comparison result. According to one embodiment of theinvention, the comparator 515 includes the application of heuristics 530to the comparison. The heuristics 530 may advantageously addresscircumstances surrounding an authentication attempt, such as, forexample, the time of day, IP address or subnet mask, purchasing profile,email address, processor serial number or ID, or the like.

[0099] Moreover, the nature of biometric data comparisons may result invarying degrees of confidence being produced from the matching ofcurrent biometric authentication data to enrollment data. For example,unlike a traditional password which may only return a positive ornegative match, a fingerprint may be determined to be a partial match,e.g. a 90% match, a 75% match, or a 10% match, rather than simply beingcorrect or incorrect. Other biometric identifiers such as voice printanalysis or face recognition may share this property of probabilisticauthentication, rather than absolute authentication.

[0100] When working with such probabilistic authentication or in othercases where an authentication is considered less than absolutelyreliable, it is desirable to apply the heuristics 530 to determinewhether the level of confidence in the authentication provided issufficiently high to authenticate the transaction which is being made.

[0101] It will sometimes be the case that the transaction at issue is arelatively low value transaction where it is acceptable to beauthenticated to a lower level of confidence. This could include atransaction which has a low dollar value associated with it (e.g., a $10purchase) or a transaction with low risk (e.g., admission to amembers-only web site).

[0102] Conversely, for authenticating other transactions, it may bedesirable to require a high degree of confidence in the authenticationbefore allowing the transaction to proceed. Such transactions mayinclude transactions of large dollar value (e.g., signing amulti-million dollar supply contract) or transaction with a high risk ifan improper authentication occurs (e.g., remotely logging onto agovernment computer).

[0103] The use of the heuristics 530 in combination with confidencelevels and transactions values may be used as will be described below toallow the comparator to provide a dynamic context-sensitiveauthentication system.

[0104] According to another embodiment of the invention, the comparator515 may advantageously track authentication attempts for a particulartransaction. For example, when a transaction fails, the trust engine 110may request the user to re-enter his or her current authentication data.The comparator 515 of the authentication engine 215 may advantageouslyemploy an attempt limiter 535 to limit the number of authenticationattempts, thereby prohibiting brute-force attempts to impersonate auser's authentication data. According to one embodiment, the attemptlimiter 535 comprises a software module monitoring transactions forrepeating authentication attempts and, for example, limiting theauthentication attempts for a given transaction to three. Thus, theattempt limiter 535 will limit an automated attempt to impersonate anindividual's authentication data to, for example, simply three“guesses.” Upon three failures, the attempt limiter 535 mayadvantageously deny additional authentication attempts. Such denial mayadvantageously be implemented through, for example, the comparator 515returning a negative result regardless of the current authenticationdata being transmitted. On the other hand, the transaction engine 205may advantageously block any additional authentication attemptspertaining to a transaction in which three attempts have previouslyfailed.

[0105] The authentication engine 215 also includes the data splittingmodule 520 and the data assembling module 525. The data splitting module520 advantageously comprises a software, hardware, or combination modulehaving the ability to mathematically operate on various data so as tosubstantially randomize and split the data into portions. According toone embodiment, original data is not recreatable from an individualportion. The data assembling module 525 advantageously comprises asoftware, hardware, or combination module configured to mathematicallyoperate on the foregoing substantially randomized portions, such thatthe combination thereof provides the original deciphered data. Accordingto one embodiment, the authentication engine 215 employs the datasplitting module 520 to randomize and split enrollment authenticationdata into portions, and employs the data assembling module 525 toreassemble the portions into usable enrollment authentication data.

[0106]FIG. 6 illustrates a block diagram of the cryptographic engine 220of the trust engine 200 of FIG. 2 according to aspects of one embodimentof the invention. Similar to the transaction engine 205 of FIG. 3, thecryptographic engine 220 comprises an operating system 605 having atleast a listening and a handling thread of a modified version of aconventional Web server, such as, for example, Web servers availablefrom Apache. As shown in FIG. 6, the cryptographic engine 220 comprisesa data splitting module 610 and a data assembling module 620 thatfunction similar to those of FIG. 5. However, according to oneembodiment, the data splitting module 610 and the data assembling module620 process cryptographic key data, as opposed to the foregoingenrollment authentication data. Although, a skilled artisan willrecognize from the disclosure herein that the data splitting module 910and the data splitting module 620 may be combined with those of theauthentication engine 215.

[0107] The cryptographic engine 220 also comprises a cryptographichandling module 625 configured to perform one, some or all of a widenumber of cryptographic functions. According to one embodiment, thecryptographic handling module 625 may comprise software modules orprograms, hardware, or both. According to another embodiment, thecryptographic handling module 625 may perform data comparisons, dataparsing, data splitting, data separating, data hashing, data encryptionor decryption, digital signature verification or creation, digitalcertificate generation, storage, or requests, cryptographic keygeneration, or the like. Moreover, a skilled artisan will recognize fromthe disclosure herein that the cryptographic handling module 825 mayadvantageously comprises a public-key infrastructure, such as PrettyGood Privacy (PGP), an RSA-based public-key system, or a wide number ofalternative key management systems. In addition, the cryptographichandling module 625 may perform public-key encryption, symmetric-keyencryption, or both. In addition to the foregoing, the cryptographichandling module 625 may include one or more computer programs ormodules, hardware, or both, for implementing seamless, transparent,interoperability functions.

[0108] A skilled artisan will also recognize from the disclosure hereinthat the cryptographic functionality may include a wide number orvariety of functions generally relating to cryptographic key managementsystems.

[0109]FIG. 7 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a depositorysystem 700 according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. Asshown in FIG. 7, the depository system 700 advantageously comprisesmultiple data storage facilities, for example, data storage facilitiesD1, D2, D3, and D4. However, it is readily understood by those ofordinary skill in the art that the depository system may have only onedata storage facility. According to one embodiment of the invention,each of the data storage facilities D1 through D4 may advantageouslycomprise some or all of the elements disclosed with reference to thedepository 210 of FIG. 4. Similar to the depository 210, the datastorage facilities D1 through D4 communicate with the transaction engine205, the authentication engine 215, and the cryptographic engine 220,preferably through conventional SSL. Communication links transferring,for example, XML documents. Communications from the transaction engine205 may advantageously include requests for data, wherein the request isadvantageously broadcast to the IP address of each data storage facilityD1 through D4. On the other hand, the transaction engine 205 maybroadcast requests to particular data storage facilities based on a widenumber of criteria, such as, for example, response time, server loads,maintenance schedules, or the like.

[0110] In response to requests for data from the transaction engine 205,the depository system 700 advantageously forwards stored data to theauthentication engine 215 and the cryptographic engine 220. Therespective data assembling modules receive the forwarded data andassemble the data into useable formats. On the other hand,communications from the authentication engine 215 and the cryptographicengine 220 to the data storage facilities D1 through D4 may include thetransmission of sensitive data to be stored. For example, according toone embodiment, the authentication engine 215 and the cryptographicengine 220 may advantageously employ their respective data splittingmodules to divide sensitive data into undecipherable portions, and thentransmit one or more undecipherable portions of the sensitive data to aparticular data storage facility.

[0111] According to one embodiment, each data storage facility, D1through D4, comprises a separate and independent storage system, suchas, for example, a directory server. According to another embodiment ofthe invention, the depository system 700 comprises multiplegeographically separated independent data storage systems. Bydistributing the sensitive data into distinct and independent storagefacilities D1 through D4, some or all of which may be advantageouslygeographically separated, the depository system 700 provides redundancyalong with additional security measures. For example, according to oneembodiment, only data from two of the multiple data storage facilities,D1 through D4, are needed to decipher and reassemble the sensitive data.Thus, as many as two of the four data storage facilities D1 through D4may be inoperative due to maintenance, system failure, power failure, orthe like, without affecting the functionality of the trust engine 110.In addition, because, according to one embodiment, the data stored ineach data storage facility is randomized and undecipherable, compromiseof any individual data storage facility does not necessarily compromisethe sensitive data. Moreover, in the embodiment having geographicalseparation of the data storage facilities, a compromise of multiplegeographically remote facilities becomes increasingly difficult. Infact, even a rogue employee will be greatly challenged to subvert theneeded multiple independent geographically remote data storagefacilities.

[0112] Although the depository system 700 is disclosed with reference toits preferred and alternative embodiments, the invention is not intendedto be limited thereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize from thedisclosure herein, a wide number of alternatives for the depositorysystem 700. For example, the depository system 700 may comprise one, twoor more data storage facilities. In addition, sensitive data may bemathematically operated such that portions from two or more data storagefacilities are needed to reassemble and decipher the sensitive data.

[0113] As mentioned in the foregoing, the authentication engine 215 andthe cryptographic engine 220 each include a data splitting module 520and 610, respectively, for splitting any type or form of sensitive data,such as, for example, text, audio, video, the authentication data andthe cryptographic key data. FIG. 8 illustrates a flowchart of a datasplitting process 800 performed by the data splitting module accordingto aspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG. 8, thedata splitting process 800 begins at step 805 when sensitive data “S” isreceived by the data splitting module of the authentication engine 215or the cryptographic engine 220. Preferably, in step 810, the datasplitting module then generates a substantially random number, value, orstring or set of bits, “A.” For example, the random number A may begenerated in a wide number of varying conventional techniques availableto one of ordinary skill in the art, for producing high quality randomnumbers suitable for use in cryptographic applications. In addition,according to one embodiment, the random number A comprises a bit lengthwhich may be any suitable length, such as shorter, longer or equal tothe bit length of the sensitive data, S.

[0114] In addition, in step 820 the data splitting process 800 generatesanother statistically random number “C.” According to the preferredembodiment, the generation of the statistically random numbers A and Cmay advantageously be done in parallel. The data splitting module thencombines the numbers A and C with the sensitive data S such that newnumbers “B” and “D” are generated. For example, number B may comprisethe binary combination of A XOR S and number D may comprise the binarycombination of C XOR S. The XOR function, or the “exclusive-or”function, is well known to those of ordinary skill in the art. Theforegoing combinations preferably occur in steps 825 and 830,respectively, and, according to one embodiment, the foregoingcombinations also occur in parallel. The data splitting process 800 thenproceeds to step 835 where the random numbers A and C and the numbers Band D are paired such that none of the pairings contain sufficient data,by themselves, to reorganize and decipher the original sensitive data S.For example, the numbers may be paired as follows: AC, AD, BC, and BD.According to one embodiment, each of the foregoing pairings isdistributed to one of the depositories D1 through D4 of FIG. 7.According to another embodiment, each of the foregoing pairings israndomly distributed to one of the depositories D1 through D4. Forexample, during a first data splitting process 800, the pairing AC maybe sent to depository D2, through, for example, a random selection ofD2's IP address. Then, during a second data splitting process 800, thepairing AC may be sent to depository D4, through, for example, a randomselection of D4's IP address. In addition, the pairings may all bestored on one depository, and may be stored in separate locations onsaid depository.

[0115] Based on the foregoing, the data splitting process 800advantageously places portions of the sensitive data in each of the fourdata storage facilities D1 through D4, such that no single data storagefacility D1 through D4 includes sufficient encrypted data to recreatethe original sensitive data S. As mentioned in the foregoing, suchrandomization of the data into individually unusable encrypted portionsincreases security and provides for maintained trust in the data even ifone of the data storage facilities, D1 through D4, is compromised.

[0116] Although the data splitting process 800 is disclosed withreference to its preferred embodiment, the invention is not intended tobe limited thereby. Rather a skilled artisan will recognize from thedisclosure herein, a wide number of alternatives for the data splittingprocess 800. For example, the data splitting process may advantageouslysplit the data into two numbers, for example, random number A and numberB and, randomly distribute A and B through two data storage facilities.Moreover, the data splitting process 800 may advantageously split thedata among a wide number of data storage facilities through generationof additional random numbers. The data may be split into any desired,selected, predetermined, or randomly assigned size unit, including butnot limited to, a bit, bits, bytes, kilobytes, megabytes or larger, orany combination or sequence of sizes. In addition, varying the sizes ofthe data units resulting from the splitting process may render the datamore difficult to restore to a useable form, thereby increasing securityof sensitive data. It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill inthe art that the split data unit sizes may be a wide variety of dataunit sizes or patterns of sizes or combinations of sizes. For example,the data unit sizes may be selected or predetermined to be all of thesame size, a fixed set of different sizes, a combination of sizes, orrandomly generates sizes. Similarly, the data units may be distributedinto one or more shares according to a fixed or predetermined data unitsize, a pattern or combination of data unit sizes, or a randomlygenerated data unit size or sizes per share.

[0117] As mentioned in the foregoing, in order to recreate the sensitivedata S, the data portions need to be derandomized and reorganized. Thisprocess may advantageously occur in the data assembling modules, 525 and620, of the authentication engine 215 and the cryptographic engine 220,respectively. The data assembling module, for example, data assemblymodule 525, receives data portions from the data storage facilities D1through D4, and reassembles the data into useable form. For example,according to one embodiment where the data splitting module 520 employedthe data splitting process 800 of FIG. 8, the data assembling module 525uses data portions from at least two of the data storage facilities D1through D4 to recreate the sensitive data S. For example, the pairingsof AC, AD, BC, and BD, were distributed such that any two provide one ofA and B, or, C and D. Noting that S=A XOR B or S=C XOR D indicates thatwhen the data assembling module receives one of A and B, or, C and D,the data assembling module 525 can advantageously reassemble thesensitive data S. Thus, the data assembling module 525 may assemble thesensitive data S, when, for example, it receives data portions from atleast the first two of the data storage facilities D1 through D4 torespond to an assemble request by the trust engine 110.

[0118] Based on the above data splitting and assembling processes, thesensitive data S exists in usable format only in a limited area of thetrust engine 110. For example, when the sensitive data S includesenrollment authentication data, usable, nonrandomized enrollmentauthentication data is available only in the authentication engine 215.Likewise, when the sensitive data S includes private cryptographic keydata, usable, nonrandomized private cryptographic key data is availableonly in the cryptographic engine 220.

[0119] Although the data splitting and assembling processes aredisclosed with reference to their preferred embodiments, the inventionis not intended to be limited thereby. Rather, a skilled artisan willrecognize from the disclosure herein, a wide number of alternatives forsplitting and reassembling the sensitive data S. For example, public-keyencryption may be used to further secure the data at the data storagefacilities D1 through D4. In addition, it is readily apparent to thoseof ordinary skill in the art that the data splitting module describedherein is also a separate and distinct embodiment of the presentinvention that may be incorporated into, combined with or otherwise madepart of any pre-existing computer systems, software suites, database, orcombinations thereof, or other embodiments of the present invention,such as the trust engine, authentication engine, and transaction enginedisclosed and described herein.

[0120]FIG. 9A illustrates a data flow of an enrollment process 900according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG.9A, the enrollment process 900 begins at step 905 when a user desires toenroll with the trust engine 110 of the cryptographic system 100.According to this embodiment, the user system 105 advantageouslyincludes a client-side applet, such as a Java-based, that queries theuser to enter enrollment data, such as demographic data and enrollmentauthentication data. According to one embodiment, the enrollmentauthentication data includes user ID, password(s), biometric(s), or thelike. According to one embodiment, during the querying process, theclient-side applet preferably communicates with the trust engine 110 toensure that a chosen user ID is unique. When the user ID is nonunique,the trust engine 110 may advantageously suggest a unique user ID. Theclient-side applet gathers the enrollment data and transmits theenrollment data, for example, through and XML document, to the trustengine 110, and in particular, to the transaction engine 205. Accordingto one embodiment, the transmission is encoded with the public key ofthe authentication engine 215.

[0121] According to one embodiment, the user performs a singleenrollment during step 905 of the enrollment process 900. For example,the user enrolls himself or herself as a particular person, such as JoeUser. When Joe User desires to enroll as Joe User, CEO of Mega Corp.,then according to this embodiment, Joe User enrolls a second time,receives a second unique user ID and the trust engine 110 does notassociate the two identities. According to another embodiment of theinvention, the enrollment process 900 provides for multiple useridentities for a single user ID. Thus, in the above example, the trustengine 110 will advantageously associate the two identities of Joe User.As will be understood by a skilled artisan from the disclosure herein, auser may have many identities, for example, Joe User the head ofhousehold, Joe User the member of the Charitable Foundations, and thelike. Even though the user may have multiple identities, according tothis embodiment, the trust engine 110 preferably stores only one set ofenrollment data. Moreover, users may advantageously add, edit/update, ordelete identities as they are needed.

[0122] Although the enrollment process 900 is disclosed with referenceto its preferred embodiment, the invention is not intended to be limitedthereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosureherein, a wide number of alternatives for gathering of enrollment data,and in particular, enrollment authentication data. For example, theapplet may be common object model (COM) based applet or the like.

[0123] On the other hand, the enrollment process may include gradedenrollment. For example, at a lowest level of enrollment, the user mayenroll over the communication link 125 without producing documentationas to his or her identity. According to an increased level ofenrollment, the user enrolls using a trusted third party, such as adigital notary. For example, and the user may appear in person to thetrusted third party, produce credentials such as a birth certificate,driver's license, military ID, or the like, and the trusted third partymay advantageously include, for example, their digital signature inenrollment submission. The trusted third party may include an actualnotary, a government agency, such as the Post Office or Department ofMotor Vehicles, a human resources person in a large company enrolling anemployee, or the like. A skilled artisan will understand from thedisclosure herein that a wide number of varying levels of enrollment mayoccur during the enrollment process 900.

[0124] After receiving the enrollment authentication data, at step 915,the transaction engine 205, using conventional FULL SSL technologyforwards the enrollment authentication data to the authentication engine215. In step 920, the authentication engine 215 decrypts the enrollmentauthentication data using the private key of the authentication engine215. In addition, the authentication engine 215 employs the datasplitting module to mathematically operate on the enrollmentauthentication data so as to split the data into at least twoindependently undecipherable, randomized, numbers. As mentioned in theforegoing, at least two numbers may comprise a statistically randomnumber and a binary XORed number. In step 925, the authentication engine215 forwards each portion of the randomized numbers to one of the datastorage facilities D1 through D4. As mentioned in the foregoing, theauthentication engine 215 may also advantageously randomize whichportions are transferred to which depositories.

[0125] Often during the enrollment process 900, the user will alsodesire to have a digital certificate issued such that he or she mayreceive encrypted documents from others outside the cryptographic system100. As mentioned in the foregoing, the certificate authority 115generally issues digital certificates according to one or more ofseveral conventional standards. Generally, the digital certificateincludes a public key of the user or system, which is known to everyone.

[0126] Whether the user requests a digital certificate at enrollment, orat another time, the request is transferred through the trust engine 110to the authentication engine 215. According to one embodiment, therequest includes an XML document having, for example, the proper name ofthe user. According to step 935, the authentication engine 215 transfersthe request to the cryptographic engine 220 instructing thecryptographic engine 220 to generate a cryptographic key or key pair.

[0127] Upon request, at step 935, the cryptographic engine 220 generatesat least one cryptographic key. According to one embodiment, thecryptographic handling module 625 generates a key pair, where one key isused as a private key, and one is used as a public key. Thecryptographic engine 220 stores the private key and, according to oneembodiment, a copy of the public key. In step 945, the cryptographicengine 220 transmits a request for a digital certificate to thetransaction engine 205. According to one embodiment, the requestadvantageously includes a standardized request, such as PKCS10, embeddedin, for example, an XML document. The request for a digital certificatemay advantageously correspond to one or more certificate authorities andthe one or more standard formats the certificate authorities require.

[0128] In step 950 the transaction engine 205 forwards this request tothe certificate authority 115, who, in step 955, returns a digitalcertificate. The return digital certificate may advantageously be in astandardized format, such as PKCS7, or in a proprietary format of one ormore of the certificate authorities 115. In step 960, the digitalcertificate is received by the transaction engine 205, and a copy isforwarded to the user and a copy is stored with the trust engine 110.The trust engine 110 stores a copy of the certificate such that thetrust engine 110 will not need to rely on the availability of thecertificate authority 115. For example, when the user desires to send adigital certificate, or a third party requests the user's digitalcertificate, the request for the digital certificate is typically sentto the certificate authority 115. However, if the certificate authority115 is conducting maintenance or has been victim of a failure orsecurity compromise, the digital certificate may not be available.

[0129] At any time after issuing the cryptographic keys, thecryptographic engine 220 may advantageously employ the data splittingprocess 800 described above such that the cryptographic keys are splitinto independently undecipherable randomized numbers. Similar to theauthentication data, at step 965 the cryptographic engine 220 transfersthe randomized numbers to the data storage facilities D1 through D4.

[0130] A skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure herein thatthe user may request a digital certificate anytime after enrollment.Moreover, the communications between systems may advantageously includeFULL SSL or public-key encryption technologies. Moreover, the enrollmentprocess may issue multiple digital certificates from multiplecertificate authorities, including one or more proprietary certificateauthorities internal or external to the trust engine 110.

[0131] As disclosed in steps 935 through 960, one embodiment of theinvention includes the request for a certificate that is eventuallystored on the trust engine 110. Because, according to one embodiment,the cryptographic handling module 625 issues the keys used by the trustengine 110, each certificate corresponds to a private key. Therefore,the trust engine 110 may advantageously provide for interoperabilitythrough monitoring the certificates owned by, or associated with, auser. For example, when the cryptographic engine 220 receives a requestfor a cryptographic function, the cryptographic handling module 625 mayinvestigate the certificates owned by the requesting user to determinewhether the user owns a private key matching the attributes of therequest. When such a certificate exists, the cryptographic handlingmodule 625 may use the certificate or the public or private keysassociated therewith, to perform the requested function. When such acertificate does not exist, the cryptographic handling module 625 mayadvantageously and transparently perform a number of actions to attemptto remedy the lack of an appropriate key. For example, FIG. 9Billustrates a flowchart of an interoperability process 970, whichaccording to aspects of an embodiment of the invention, discloses theforegoing steps to ensure the cryptographic handling module 625 performscryptographic functions using appropriate keys.

[0132] As shown in FIG. 9B, the interoperability process 970 begins withstep 972 where the cryptographic handling module 925 determines the typeof certificate desired. According to one embodiment of the invention,the type of certificate may advantageously be specified in the requestfor cryptographic functions, or other data provided by the requester.According to another embodiment, the certificate type may be ascertainedby the data format of the request. For example, the cryptographichandling module 925 may advantageously recognize the request correspondsto a particular type.

[0133] According to one embodiment, the certificate type may include oneor more algorithm standards, for example, RSA, ELGAMAL, or the like. Inaddition, the certificate type may include one or more key types, suchas symmetric keys, public keys, strong encryption keys such as 256 bitkeys, less secure keys, or the like. Moreover, the certificate type mayinclude upgrades or replacements of one or more of the foregoingalgorithm standards or keys, one or more message or data formats, one ormore data encapsulation or encoding schemes, such as Base 32 or Base 64.The certificate type may also include compatibility with one or morethird-party cryptographic applications or interfaces, one or morecommunication protocols, or one or more certificate standards orprotocols. A skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure hereinthat other differences may exist in certificate types, and translationsto and from those differences may be implemented as disclosed herein.

[0134] Once the cryptographic handling module 625 determines thecertificate type, the interoperability process 970 proceeds to step 974,and determines whether the user owns a certificate matching the typedetermined in step 974. When the user owns a matching certificate, forexample, the trust engine 110 has access to the matching certificatethrough, for example, prior storage thereof, the cryptographic handlingmodule 825 knows that a matching private key is also stored within thetrust engine 110. For example, the matching private key may be storedwithin the depository 210 or depository system 700. The cryptographichandling module 625 may advantageously request the matching private keybe assembled from, for example, the depository 210, and then in step976, use the matching private key to perform cryptographic actions orfunctions. For example, as mentioned in the foregoing, the cryptographichandling module 625 may advantageously perform hashing, hashcomparisons, data encryption or decryption, digital signatureverification or creation, or the like.

[0135] When the user does not own a matching certificate, theinteroperability process 970 proceeds to step 978 where thecryptographic handling module 625 determines whether the users owns across-certified certificate. According to one embodiment,cross-certification between certificate authorities occurs when a firstcertificate authority determines to trust certificates from a secondcertificate authority. In other words, the first certificate authoritydetermines that certificates from the second certificate authority meetscertain quality standards, and therefore, may be “certified” asequivalent to the first certificate authority's own certificates.Cross-certification becomes more complex when the certificateauthorities issue, for example, certificates having levels of trust. Forexample, the first certificate authority may provide three levels oftrust for a particular certificate, usually based on the degree ofreliability in the enrollment process, while the second certificateauthority may provide seven levels of trust. Cross-certification mayadvantageously track which levels and which certificates from the secondcertificate authority may be substituted for which levels and whichcertificates from the first. When the foregoing cross-certification isdone officially and publicly between two certification authorities, themapping of certificates and levels to one another is often called“chaining.”

[0136] According to another embodiment of the invention, thecryptographic handling module 625 may advantageously developcross-certifications outside those agreed upon by the certificateauthorities. For example, the cryptographic handling module 625 mayaccess a first certificate authority's certificate practice statement(CPS), or other published policy statement, and using, for example, theauthentication tokens required by particular trust levels, match thefirst certificate authority's certificates to those of anothercertificate authority.

[0137] When, in step 978, the cryptographic handling module 625determines that the users owns a cross-certified certificate, theinteroperability process 970 proceeds to step 976, and performs thecryptographic action or function using the cross-certified public key,private key, or both. Alternatively, when the cryptographic handlingmodule 625 determines that the users does not own a cross-certifiedcertificate, the interoperability process 970 proceeds to step 980,where the cryptographic handling module 625 selects a certificateauthority that issues the requested certificate type, or a certificatecross-certified thereto. In step 982, the cryptographic handling module625 determines whether the user enrollment authentication data,discussed in the foregoing, meets the authentication requirements of thechosen certificate authority. For example, if the user enrolled over anetwork by, for example, answering demographic and other questions, theauthentication data provided may establish a lower level of trust than auser providing biometric data and appearing before a third-party, suchas, for example, a notary. According to one embodiment, the foregoingauthentication requirements may advantageously be provided in the chosenauthentication authority's CPS.

[0138] When the user has provided the trust engine 110 with enrollmentauthentication data meeting the requirements of chosen certificateauthority, the interoperability process 970 proceeds to step 984, wherethe cryptographic handling module 825 acquires the certificate from thechosen certificate authority. According to one embodiment, thecryptographic handling module 625 acquires the certificate by followingsteps 945 through 960 of the enrollment process 900. For example, thecryptographic handling module 625 may advantageously employ one or morepublic keys from one or more of the key pairs already available to thecryptographic engine 220, to request the certificate from thecertificate authority. According to another embodiment, thecryptographic handling module 625 may advantageously generate one ormore new key pairs, and use the public keys corresponding thereto, torequest the certificate from the certificate authority.

[0139] According to another embodiment, the trust engine 110 mayadvantageously include one or more certificate issuing modules capableof issuing one or more certificate types. According to this embodiment,the certificate issuing module may provide the foregoing certificate.When the cryptographic handling module 625 acquires the certificate, theinteroperability process 970 proceeds to step 976, and performs thecryptographic action or function using the public key, private key, orboth corresponding to the acquired certificate.

[0140] When the user, in step 982, has not provided the trust engine 110with enrollment authentication data meeting the requirements of chosencertificate authority, the cryptographic handling module 625 determines,in step 986 whether there are other certificate authorities that havedifferent authentication requirements. For example, the cryptographichandling module 625 may look for certificate authorities having lowerauthentication requirements, but still issue the chosen certificates, orcross-certifications thereof.

[0141] When the foregoing certificate authority having lowerrequirements exists, the interoperability process 970 proceeds to step980 and chooses that certificate authority. Alternatively, when no suchcertificate authority exists, in step 988, the trust engine 110 mayrequest additional authentication tokens from the user. For example, thetrust engine 110 may request new enrollment authentication datacomprising, for example, biometric data. Also, the trust engine 110 mayrequest the user appear before a trusted third party and provideappropriate authenticating credentials, such as, for example, appearingbefore a notary with a drivers license, social security card, bank card,birth certificate, military ID, or the like. When the trust engine 110receives updated authentication data, the interoperability process 970proceeds to step 984 and acquires the foregoing chosen certificate.

[0142] Through the foregoing interoperability process 970, thecryptographic handling module 625 advantageously provides seamless,transparent, translations and conversions between differingcryptographic systems. A skilled artisan will recognize from thedisclosure herein, a wide number of advantages and implementations ofthe foregoing interoperable system. For example, the foregoing step 986of the interoperability process 970 may advantageously include aspectsof trust arbitrage, discussed in further detail below, where thecertificate authority may under special circumstances accept lowerlevels of cross-certification. In addition, the interoperability process970 may include ensuring interoperability between and employment ofstandard certificate revocations, such as employing certificaterevocation lists (CRL), online certificate status protocols (OCSP), orthe like.

[0143]FIG. 10 illustrates a data flow of an authentication process 1000according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. According to oneembodiment, the authentication process 1000 includes gathering currentauthentication data from a user and comparing that to the enrollmentauthentication data of the user. For example, the authentication process1000 begins at step 1005 where a user desires to perform a transactionwith, for example, a vendor. Such transactions may include, for example,selecting a purchase option, requesting access to a restricted area ordevice of the vendor system 120, or the like. At step 1010, a vendorprovides the user with a transaction ID and an authentication request.The transaction ID may advantageously include a 192 bit quantity havinga 32 bit timestamp concatenated with a 128 bit random quantity, or a“nonce,” concatenated with a 32 bit vendor specific constant. Such atransaction ID uniquely identifies the transaction such that copycattransactions can be refused by the trust engine 110.

[0144] The authentication request may advantageously include what levelof authentication is needed for a particular transaction. For example,the vendor may specify a particular level of confidence that is requiredfor the transaction at issue. If authentication cannot be made to thislevel of confidence, as will be discussed below, the transaction willnot occur without either further authentication by the user to raise thelevel of confidence, or a change in the terms of the authenticationbetween the vendor and the server. These issues are discussed morecompletely below.

[0145] According to one embodiment, the transaction ID and theauthentication request may be advantageously generated by a vendor-sideapplet or other software program. In addition, the transmission of thetransaction ID and authentication data may include one or more XMLdocuments encrypted using conventional SSL technology, such as, forexample, ½ SSL, or, in other words vendor-side authenticated SSL.

[0146] After the user system 105 receives the transaction ID andauthentication request, the user system 105 gathers the currentauthentication data, potentially including current biometricinformation, from the user. The user system 105, at step 1015, encryptsat least the current authentication data “B” and the transaction ID,with the public key of the authentication engine 215, and transfers thatdata to the trust engine 110. The transmission preferably comprises XMLdocuments encrypted with at least conventional ½ SSL technology. In step1020, the transaction engine 205 receives the transmission, preferablyrecognizes the data format or request in the URL or URI, and forwardsthe transmission to the authentication engine 215.

[0147] During steps 1015 and 1020, the vendor system 120, at step 1025,forwards the transaction ID and the authentication request to the trustengine 110, using the preferred FULL SSL technology. This communicationmay also include a vendor ID, although vendor identification may also becommunicated through a non-random portion of the transaction ID. Atsteps 1030 and 1035, the transaction engine 205 receives thecommunication, creates a record in the audit trail, and generates arequest for the user's enrollment authentication data to be assembledfrom the data storage facilities D1 through D4. At step 1040, thedepository system 700 transfers the portions of the enrollmentauthentication data corresponding to the user to the authenticationengine 215. At step 1045, the authentication engine 215 decrypts thetransmission using its private key and compares the enrollmentauthentication data to the current authentication data provided by theuser.

[0148] The comparison of step 1045 may advantageously apply heuristicalcontext sensitive authentication, as referred to in the forgoing, anddiscussed in further detail below. For example, if the biometricinformation received does not match perfectly, a lower confidence matchresults. In particular embodiments, the level of confidence of theauthentication is balanced against the nature of the transaction and thedesires of both the user and the vendor. Again, this is discussed ingreater detail below.

[0149] At step 1050, the authentication engine 215 fills in theauthentication request with the result of the comparison of step 1045.According to one embodiment of the invention, the authentication requestis filled with a YES/NO or TRUE/FALSE result of the authenticationprocess 1000. In step 1055 the filled-in authentication request isreturned to the vendor for the vendor to act upon, for example, allowingthe user to complete the transaction that initiated the authenticationrequest. According to one embodiment, a confirmation message is passedto the user.

[0150] Based on the foregoing, the authentication process 1000advantageously keeps sensitive data secure and produces resultsconfigured to maintain the integrity of the sensitive data. For example,the sensitive data is assembled only inside the authentication engine215. For example, the enrollment authentication data is undecipherableuntil it is assembled in the authentication engine 215 by the dataassembling module, and the current authentication data is undecipherableuntil it is unwrapped by the conventional SSL technology and the privatekey of the authentication engine 215. Moreover, the authenticationresult transmitted to the vendor does not include the sensitive data,and the user may not even know whether he or she produced validauthentication data.

[0151] Although the authentication process 1000 is disclosed withreference to its preferred and alternative embodiments, the invention isnot intended to be limited thereby. Rather, a skilled artisan willrecognize from the disclosure herein, a wide number of alternatives forthe authentication process 1000. For example, the vendor mayadvantageously be replaced by almost any requesting application, eventhose residing with the user system 105. For example, a clientapplication, such as Microsoft Word, may use an application programinterface (API) or a cryptographic API (CAPI) to request authenticationbefore unlocking a document. Alternatively, a mail server, a network, acellular phone, a personal or mobile computing device, a workstation, orthe like, may all make authentication requests that can be filled by theauthentication process 1000. In fact, after providing the foregoingtrusted authentication process 1000, the requesting application ordevice may provide access to or use of a wide number of electronic orcomputer devices or systems.

[0152] Moreover, the authentication process 1000 may employ a widenumber of alternative procedures in the event of authentication failure.For example, authentication failure may maintain the same transaction IDand request that the user reenter his or her current authenticationdata. As mentioned in the foregoing, use of the same transaction IDallows the comparator of the authentication engine 215 to monitor andlimit the number of authentication attempts for a particulartransaction, thereby creating a more secure cryptographic system 100.

[0153] In addition, the authentication process 1000 may beadvantageously be employed to develop elegant single sign-on solutions,such as, unlocking a sensitive data vault. For example, successful orpositive authentication may provide the authenticated user the abilityto automatically access any number of passwords for an almost limitlessnumber of systems and applications. For example, authentication of auser may provide the user access to password, login, financialcredentials, or the like, associated with multiple online vendors, alocal area network, various personal computing devices, Internet serviceproviders, auction providers, investment brokerages, or the like. Byemploying a sensitive data vault, users may choose truly large andrandom passwords because they no longer need to remember them throughassociation. Rather, the authentication process 1000 provides accessthereto. For example, a user may choose a random alphanumeric stringthat is twenty plus digits in length rather than something associatedwith a memorable data, name, etc.

[0154] According to one embodiment, a sensitive data vault associatedwith a given user may advantageously be stored in the data storagefacilities of the depository 210, or split and stored in the depositorysystem 700. According to this embodiment, after positive userauthentication, the trust engine 110 serves the requested sensitivedata, such as, for example, to the appropriate password to therequesting application. According to another embodiment, the trustengine 110 may include a separate system for storing the sensitive datavault. For example, the trust engine 110 may include a stand-alonesoftware engine implementing the data vault functionality andfiguratively residing “behind” the foregoing front-end security systemof the trust engine 110. According to this embodiment, the softwareengine serves the requested sensitive data after the software enginereceives a signal indicating positive user authentication from the trustengine 110.

[0155] In yet another embodiment, the data vault may be implemented by athird-party system. Similar to the software engine embodiment, thethird-party system may advantageously serve the requested sensitive dataafter the third-party system receives a signal indicating positive userauthentication from the trust engine 110. According to yet anotherembodiment, the data vault may be implemented on the user system 105. Auser-side software engine may advantageously serve the foregoing dataafter receiving a signal indicating positive user authentication fromthe trust engine 110.

[0156] Although the foregoing data vaults are disclosed with referenceto alternative embodiments, a skilled artisan will recognize from thedisclosure herein, a wide number of additional implementations thereof.For example, a particular data vault may include aspects from some orall of the foregoing embodiments. In addition, any of the foregoing datavaults may employ one or more authentication requests at varying times.For example, any of the data vaults may require authentication every oneor more transactions, periodically, every one or more sessions, everyaccess to one or more Webpages or Websites, at one or more otherspecified intervals, or the like.

[0157]FIG. 11 illustrates a data flow of a signing process 1100according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG.11, the signing process 1100 includes steps similar to those of theauthentication process 1000 described in the foregoing with reference toFIG. 10. According to one embodiment of the invention, the signingprocess 1100 first authenticates the user and then performs one or moreof several digital signing functions as will be discussed in furtherdetail below. According to another embodiment, the signing process 1100may advantageously store data related thereto, such as hashes ofmessages or documents, or the like. This data may advantageously be usedin an audit or any other event, such as for example, when aparticipating party attempts to repudiate a transaction.

[0158] As shown in FIG. 11, during the authentication steps, the userand vendor may advantageously agree on a message, such as, for example,a contract. During signing, the signing process 1100 advantageouslyensures that the contract signed by the user is identical to thecontract supplied by the vendor. Therefore, according to one embodiment,during authentication, the vendor and the user include a hash of theirrespective copies of the message or contract, in the data transmitted tothe authentication engine 215. By employing only a hash of a message orcontract, the trust engine 110 may advantageously store a significantlyreduced amount of data, providing for a more efficient and costeffective cryptographic system. In addition, the stored hash may beadvantageously compared to a hash of a document in question to determinewhether the document in question matches one signed by any of theparties. The ability to determine whether the document is identical toone relating to a transaction provides for additional evidence that canbe used against a claim for repudiation by a party to a transaction.

[0159] In step 1103, the authentication engine 215 assembles theenrollment authentication data and compares it to the currentauthentication data provided by the user. When the comparator of theauthentication engine 215 indicates that the enrollment authenticationdata matches the current authentication data, the comparator of theauthentication engine 215 also compares the hash of the message suppliedby the vendor to the hash of the message supplied by the user. Thus, theauthentication engine 215 advantageously ensures that the message agreedto by the user is identical to that agreed to by the vendor.

[0160] In step 1105, the authentication engine 215 transmits a digitalsignature request to the cryptographic engine 220. According to oneembodiment of the invention, the request includes a hash of the messageor contract. However, a skilled artisan will recognize from thedisclosure herein that the cryptographic engine 220 may encryptvirtually any type of data, including, but not limited to, video, audio,biometrics, images or text to form the desired digital signature.Returning to step 1105, the digital signature request preferablycomprises an XML document communicated through conventional SSLtechnologies.

[0161] In step 1110, the authentication engine 215 transmits a requestto each of the data storage facilities D1 through D4, such that each ofthe data storage facilities D1 through D4 transmit their respectiveportion of the cryptographic key or keys corresponding to a signingparty. According to another embodiment, the cryptographic engine 220employs some or all of the steps of the interoperability process 970discussed in the foregoing, such that the cryptographic engine 220 firstdetermines the appropriate key or keys to request from the depository210 or the depository system 700 for the signing party, and takesactions to provide appropriate matching keys. According to still anotherembodiment, the authentication engine 215 or the cryptographic engine220 may advantageously request one or more of the keys associated withthe signing party and stored in the depository 210 or depository system700.

[0162] According to one embodiment, the signing party includes one orboth the user and the vendor. In such case, the authentication engine215 advantageously requests the cryptographic keys corresponding to theuser and/or the vendor. According to another embodiment, the signingparty includes the trust engine 110. In this embodiment, the trustengine 110 is certifying that the authentication process 1000 properlyauthenticated the user, vendor, or both. Therefore, the authenticationengine 215 requests the cryptographic key of the trust engine 110, suchas, for example, the key belonging to the cryptographic engine 220, toperform the digital signature. According to another embodiment, thetrust engine 110 performs a digital notary-like function. In thisembodiment, the signing party includes the user, vendor, or both, alongwith the trust engine 110. Thus, the trust engine 110 provides thedigital signature of the user and/or vendor, and then indicates with itsown digital signature that the user and/or vendor were properlyauthenticated. In this embodiment, the authentication engine 215 mayadvantageously request assembly of the cryptographic keys correspondingto the user, the vendor, or both. According to another embodiment, theauthentication engine 215 may advantageously request assembly of thecryptographic keys corresponding to the trust engine 110.

[0163] According to another embodiment, the trust engine 110 performspower of attorney-like functions. For example, the trust engine 110 maydigitally sign the message on behalf of a third party. In such case, theauthentication engine 215 requests the cryptographic keys associatedwith the third party. According to this embodiment, the signing process1100 may advantageously include authentication of the third party,before allowing power of attorney-like functions. In addition, theauthentication process 1000 may include a check for third partyconstraints, such as, for example, business logic or the like dictatingwhen and in what circumstances a particular third-party's signature maybe used.

[0164] Based on the foregoing, in step 1110, the authentication enginerequested the cryptographic keys from the data storage facilities D1through D4 corresponding to the signing party. In step 1115, the datastorage facilities D1 through D4 transmit their respective portions ofthe cryptographic key corresponding to the signing party to thecryptographic engine 220. According to one embodiment, the foregoingtransmissions include SSL technologies. According to another embodiment,the foregoing transmissions may advantageously be super-encrypted withthe public key of the cryptographic engine 220.

[0165] In step 1120, the cryptographic engine 220 assembles theforegoing cryptographic keys of the signing party and encrypts themessage therewith, thereby forming the digital signature(s). In step1125 of the signing process 1100, the cryptographic engine 220 transmitsthe digital signature(s) to the authentication engine 215. In step 1130,the authentication engine 215 transmits the filled-in authenticationrequest along with a copy of the hashed message and the digitalsignature(s) to the transaction engine 205. In step 1135, thetransaction engine 205 transmits a receipt comprising the transactionID, an indication of whether the authentication was successful, and thedigital signature(s), to the vendor. According to one embodiment, theforegoing transmission may advantageously include the digital signatureof the trust engine 110. For example, the trust engine 110 may encryptthe hash of the receipt with its private key, thereby forming a digitalsignature to be attached to the transmission to the vendor.

[0166] According to one embodiment, the transaction engine 205 alsotransmits a confirmation message to the user. Although the signingprocess 1100 is disclosed with reference to its preferred andalternative embodiments, the invention is not intended to be limitedthereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosureherein, a wide number of alternatives for the signing process 1100. Forexample, the vendor may be replaced with a user application, such as anemail application. For example, the user may wish to digitally sign aparticular email with his or her digital signature. In such anembodiment, the transmission throughout the signing process 1100 mayadvantageously include only one copy of a hash of the message. Moreover,a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure herein that a widenumber of client applications may request digital signatures. Forexample, the client applications may comprise word processors,spreadsheets, emails, voicemail, access to restricted system areas, orthe like.

[0167] In addition, a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosureherein that steps 1105 through 1120 of the signing process 1100 mayadvantageously employ some or all of the steps of the interoperabilityprocess 970 of FIG. 9B, thereby providing interoperability betweendiffering cryptographic systems that may, for example, need to processthe digital signature under differing signature types.

[0168]FIG. 12 illustrates a data flow of an encryption/decryptionprocess 1200 according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. Asshown in FIG. 12, the decryption process 1200 begins by authenticatingthe user using the authentication process 1000. According to oneembodiment, the authentication process 1000 includes in theauthentication request, a synchronous session key. For example, inconventional PKI technologies, it is understood by skilled artisans thatencrypting or decrypting data using public and private keys ismathematically intensive and may require significant system resources.However, in symmetric key cryptographic systems, or systems where thesender and receiver of a message share a single common key that is usedto encrypt and decrypt a message, the mathematical operations aresignificantly simpler and faster. Thus, in the conventional PKItechnologies, the sender of a message will generate synchronous sessionkey, and encrypt the message using the simpler, faster symmetric keysystem. Then, the sender will encrypt the session key with the publickey of the receiver. The encrypted session key will be attached to thesynchronously encrypted message and both data are sent to the receiver.The receiver uses his or her private key to decrypt the session key, andthen uses the session key to decrypt the message. Based on theforegoing, the simpler and faster symmetric key system is used for themajority of the encryption/decryption processing. Thus, in thedecryption process 1200, the decryption advantageously assumes that asynchronous key has been encrypted with the public key of the user.Thus, as mentioned in the foregoing, the encrypted session key isincluded in the authentication request.

[0169] Returning to the decryption process 1200, after the user has beenauthenticated in step 1205, the authentication engine 215 forwards theencrypted session key to the cryptographic engine 220. In step 1210, theauthentication engine 215 forwards a request to each of the data storagefacilities, D1 through D4, requesting the cryptographic key data of theuser. In step 1215, each data storage facility, D1 through D4, transmitstheir respective portion of the cryptographic key to the cryptographicengine 220. According to one embodiment, the foregoing transmission isencrypted with the public key of the cryptographic engine 220.

[0170] In step 1220 of the decryption process 1200, the cryptographicengine 220 assembles the cryptographic key and decrypts the session keytherewith. In step 1225, the cryptographic engine forwards the sessionkey to the authentication engine 215. In step 1227, the authenticationengine 215 fills in the authentication request including the decryptedsession key, and transmits the filled-in authentication request to thetransaction engine 205. In step 1230, the transaction engine 205forwards the authentication request along with the session key to therequesting application or vendor. Then, according to one embodiment, therequesting application or vendor uses the session key to decrypt theencrypted message.

[0171] Although the decryption process 1200 is disclosed with referenceto its preferred and alternative embodiments, a skilled artisan willrecognize from the disclosure herein, a wide number of alternatives forthe decryption process 1200. For example, the decryption process 1200may forego synchronous key encryption and rely on full public-keytechnology. In such an embodiment, the requesting application maytransmit the entire message to the cryptographic engine 220, or, mayemploy some type of compression or reversible hash in order to transmitthe message to the cryptographic engine 220. A skilled artisan will alsorecognize from the disclosure herein that the foregoing communicationsmay advantageously include XML documents wrapped in SSL technology.

[0172] The encryption/decryption process 1200 also provides forencryption of documents or other data. Thus, in step 1235, a requestingapplication or vendor may advantageously transmit to the transactionengine 205 of the trust engine 110, a request for the public key of theuser. The requesting application or vendor makes this request becausethe requesting application or vendor uses the public key of the user,for example, to encrypt the session key that will be used to encrypt thedocument or message. As mentioned in the enrollment process 900, thetransaction engine 205 stores a copy of the digital certificate of theuser, for example, in the mass storage 225. Thus, in step 1240 of theencryption process 1200, the transaction engine 205 requests the digitalcertificate of the user from the mass storage 225. In step 1245, themass storage 225 transmits the digital certificate corresponding to theuser, to the transaction engine 205. In step 1250, the transactionengine 205 transmits the digital certificate to the requestingapplication or vendor. According to one embodiment, the encryptionportion of the encryption process 1200 does not include theauthentication of a user. This is because the requesting vendor needsonly the public key of the user, and is not requesting any sensitivedata.

[0173] A skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure herein thatif a particular user does not have a digital certificate, the trustengine 110 may employ some or all of the enrollment process 900 in orderto generate a digital certificate for that particular user. Then, thetrust engine 110 may initiate the encryption/decryption process 1200 andthereby provide the appropriate digital certificate. In addition, askilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure herein that steps1220 and 1235 through 1250 of the encryption/decryption process 1200 mayadvantageously employ some or all of the steps of the interoperabilityprocess of FIG. 9B, thereby providing interoperability between differingcryptographic systems that may, for example, need to process theencryption.

[0174]FIG. 13 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a trust enginesystem 1300 according to aspects of yet another embodiment of theinvention. As shown in FIG. 13, the trust engine system 1300 comprises aplurality of distinct trust engines 1305, 1310, 1315, and 1320,respectively. To facilitate a more complete understanding of theinvention, FIG. 13 illustrates each trust engine, 1305, 1310, 1315, and1320 as having a transaction engine, a depository, and an authenticationengine. However, a skilled artisan will recognize that each transactionengine may advantageously comprise some, a combination, or all of theelements and communication channels disclosed with reference to FIGS.1-8. For example, one embodiment may advantageously include trustengines having one or more transaction engines, depositories, andcryptographic servers or any combinations thereof.

[0175] According to one embodiment of the invention, each of the trustengines 1305, 1310, 1315 and 1320 are geographically separated, suchthat, for example, the trust engine 1305 may reside in a first location,the trust engine 1310 may reside in a second location, the trust engine1315 may reside in a third location, and the trust engine 1320 mayreside in a fourth location. The foregoing geographic separationadvantageously decreases system response time while increasing thesecurity of the overall trust engine system 1300.

[0176] For example, when a user logs onto the cryptographic system 100,the user may be nearest the first location and may desire to beauthenticated. As described with reference to FIG. 10, to beauthenticated, the user provides current authentication data, such as abiometric or the like, and the current authentication data is comparedto that user's enrollment authentication data. Therefore, according toone example, the user advantageously provides current authenticationdata to the geographically nearest trust engine 1305. The transactionengine 1321 of the trust engine 1305 then forwards the currentauthentication data to the authentication engine 1322 also residing atthe first location. According to another embodiment, the transactionengine 1321 forwards the current authentication data to one or more ofthe authentication engines of the trust engines 1310, 1315, or 1320.

[0177] The transaction engine 1321 also requests the assembly of theenrollment authentication data from the depositories of, for example,each of the trust engines, 1305 through 1320. According to thisembodiment, each depository provides its portion of the enrollmentauthentication data to the authentication engine 1322 of the trustengine 1305. The authentication engine 1322 then employs the encrypteddata portions from, for example, the first two depositories to respond,and assembles the enrollment authentication data into deciphered form.The authentication engine 1322 compares the enrollment authenticationdata with the current authentication data and returns an authenticationresult to the transaction engine 1321 of the trust engine 1305.

[0178] Based on the above, the trust engine system 1300 employs thenearest one of a plurality of geographically separated trust engines,1305 through 1320, to perform the authentication process. According toone embodiment of the invention, the routing of information to thenearest transaction engine may advantageously be performed atclient-side applets executing on one or more of the user system 105,vendor system 120, or certificate authority 115. According to analternative embodiment, a more sophisticated decision process may beemployed to select from the trust engines 1305 through 1320. Forexample, the decision may be based on the availability, operability,speed of connections, load, performance, geographic proximity, or acombination thereof, of a given trust engine.

[0179] In this way, the trust engine system 1300 lowers its responsetime while maintaining the security advantages associated withgeographically remote data storage facilities, such as those discussedwith reference to FIG. 7 where each data storage facility storesrandomized portions of sensitive data. For example, a securitycompromise at, for example, the depository 1325 of the trust engine 1315does not necessarily compromise the sensitive data of the trust enginesystem 1300. This is because the depository 1325 contains onlynon-decipherable randomized data that, without more, is entirelyuseless.

[0180] According to another embodiment, the trust engine system 1300 mayadvantageously include multiple cryptographic engines arranged similarto the authentication engines. The cryptographic engines mayadvantageously perform cryptographic functions such as those disclosedwith reference to FIGS. 1-8. According to yet another embodiment, thetrust engine system 1300 may advantageously replace the multipleauthentication engines with multiple cryptographic engines, therebyperforming cryptographic functions such as those disclosed withreference to FIGS. 1-8. According to yet another embodiment of theinvention, the trust engine system 1300 may replace each multipleauthentication engine with an engine having some or all of thefunctionality of the authentication engines, cryptographic engines, orboth, as disclosed in the foregoing.

[0181] Although the trust engine system 1300 is disclosed with referenceto its preferred and alternative embodiments, a skilled artisan willrecognize that the trust engine system 1300 may comprise portions oftrust engines 1305 through 1320. For example, the trust engine system1300 may include one or more transaction engines, one or moredepositories, one or more authentication engines, or one or morecryptographic engines or combinations thereof.

[0182]FIG. 14 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a trust engineSystem 1400 according to aspects of yet another embodiment of theinvention. As shown in FIG. 14, the trust engine system 1400 includesmultiple trust engines 1405, 1410, 1415 and 1420. According to oneembodiment, each of the trust engines 1405, 1410, 1415 and 1420,comprise some or all of the elements of trust engine 110 disclosed withreference to FIGS. 1-8. According to this embodiment, when the clientside applets of the user system 105, the vendor system 120, or thecertificate authority 115, communicate with the trust engine system1400, those communications are sent to the IP address of each of thetrust engines 1405 through 1420. Further, each transaction engine ofeach of the trust engines, 1405, 1410, 1415, and 1420, behaves similarto the transaction engine 1321 of the trust engine 1305 disclosed withreference to FIG. 13. For example, during an authentication process,each transaction engine of each of the trust engines 1405, 1410, 1415,and 1420 transmits the current authentication data to their respectiveauthentication engines and transmits a request to assemble therandomized data stored in each of the depositories of each of the trustengines 1405 through 1420. FIG. 14 does not illustrate all of thesecommunications; as such illustration would become overly complex.Continuing with the authentication process, each of the depositoriesthen communicates its portion of the randomized data to each of theauthentication engines of the each of the trust engines 1405 through1420. Each of the authentication engines of the each of the trustengines employs its comparator to determine whether the currentauthentication data matches the enrollment authentication data providedby the depositories of each of the trust engines 1405 through 1420.According to this embodiment, the result of the comparison by each ofthe authentication engines is then transmitted to a redundancy module ofthe other three trust engines. For example, the result of theauthentication engine from the trust engine 1405 is transmitted to theredundancy modules of the trust engines 1410, 1415, and 1420. Thus, theredundancy module of the trust engine 1405 likewise receives the resultof the authentication engines from the trust engines 1410, 1415, and1420.

[0183]FIG. 15 illustrates a block diagram of the redundancy module ofFIG. 14. The redundancy module comprises a comparator configured toreceive the authentication result from three authentication engines andtransmit that result to the transaction engine of the fourth trustengine. The comparator compares the authentication result form the threeauthentication engines, and if two of the results agree, the comparatorconcludes that the authentication result should match that of the twoagreeing authentication engines. This result is then transmitted back tothe transaction engine corresponding to the trust engine not associatedwith the three authentication engines.

[0184] Based on the foregoing, the redundancy module determines anauthentication result from data received from authentication enginesthat are preferably geographically remote from the trust engine of thatthe redundancy module. By providing such redundancy functionality, thetrust engine system 1400 ensures that a compromise of the authenticationengine of one of the trust engines 1405 through 1420, is insufficient tocompromise the authentication result of the redundancy module of thatparticular trust engine. A skilled artisan will recognize thatredundancy module functionality of the trust engine system 1400 may alsobe applied to the cryptographic engine of each of the trust engines 1405through 1420. However, such cryptographic engine communication was notshown in FIG. 14 to avoid complexity. Moreover, a skilled artisan willrecognize a wide number of alternative authentication result conflictresolution algorithms for the comparator of FIG. 15 are suitable for usein the present invention.

[0185] According to yet another embodiment of the invention, the trustengine system 1400 may advantageously employ the redundancy moduleduring cryptographic. comparison steps. For example, some or all of theforegoing redundancy module disclosure with reference to FIGS. 14 and 15may advantageously be implemented during a hash comparison of documentsprovided by one or more parties during a particular transaction.

[0186] Although the foregoing invention has been described in terms ofcertain preferred and alternative embodiments, other embodiments will beapparent to those of ordinary skill in the art from the disclosureherein. For example, the trust engine 110 may issue short-termcertificates, where the private cryptographic key is released to theuser for a predetermined period of time. For example, currentcertificate standards include a validity field that can be set to expireafter a predetermined amount of time. Thus, the trust engine 110 mayrelease a private key to a user where the private key would be validfor, for example, 24 hours. According to such an embodiment, the trustengine 110 may advantageously issue a new cryptographic key pair to beassociated with a particular user and then release the private key ofthe new cryptographic key pair. Then, once the private cryptographic keyis released, the trust engine 110 immediately expires any internal validuse of such private key, as it is no longer securable by the trustengine 110.

[0187] In addition, a skilled artisan will recognize that thecryptographic system 100 or the trust engine 110 may include the abilityto recognize any type of devices, such as, but not limited to, a laptop,a cell phone, a network, a biometric device or the like. According toone embodiment, such recognition may come from data supplied in therequest for a particular service, such as, a request for authenticationleading to access or use, a request for cryptographic functionality, orthe like. According to one embodiment, the foregoing request may includea unique device identifier, such as, for example, a processor ID.Alternatively, the request may include data in a particular recognizabledata format. For example, mobile and satellite phones often do notinclude the processing power for full X509.v3 heavy encryptioncertificates, and therefore do not request them. According to thisembodiment, the trust engine 110 may recognize the type of data formatpresented, and respond only in kind.

[0188] In an additional aspect of the system described above, contextsensitive authentication can be provided using various techniques aswill be described below. Context sensitive authentication, for exampleas shown in FIG. 16, provides the possibility of evaluating not only theactual data which is sent by the user when attempting to authenticatehimself, but also the circumstances surrounding the generation anddelivery of that data. Such techniques may also support transactionspecific trust arbitrage between the user and trust engine 110 orbetween the vendor and trust engine 110, as will be described below.

[0189] As discussed above, authentication is the process of proving thata user is who he says he is. Generally, authentication requiresdemonstrating some fact to an authentication authority. The trust engine110 of the present invention represents the authority to which a usermust authenticate himself. The user must demonstrate to the trust engine110 that he is who he says he is by either: knowing something that onlythe user should know (knowledge-based authentication), having somethingthat only the user should have (token-based authentication), or by beingsomething that only the user should be (biometric-based authentication).

[0190] Examples of knowledge-based authentication include withoutlimitation a password, PIN number, or lock combination. Examples oftoken-based authentication include without limitation a house key, aphysical credit card, a driver's license, or a particular phone number.Examples of biometric-based authentication include without limitation afingerprint, handwriting analysis, facial scan, hand scan, ear scan,iris scan, vascular pattern, DNA, a voice analysis, or a retinal scan.

[0191] Each type of authentication has particular advantages anddisadvantages, and each provides a different level of security. Forexample, it is generally harder to create a false fingerprint thatmatches someone else's than it is to overhear someone's password andrepeat it. Each type of authentication also requires a different type ofdata to be known to the authenticating authority in order to verifysomeone using that form of authentication.

[0192] As used herein, “authentication” will refer broadly to theoverall process of verifying someone's identity to be who he says he is.An “authentication technique” will refer to a particular type ofauthentication based upon a particular piece of knowledge, physicaltoken, or biometric reading. “Authentication data” refers to informationwhich is sent to or otherwise demonstrated to an authenticationauthority in order to establish identity. “Enrollment data” will referto the data which is initially submitted to an authentication authorityin order to establish a baseline for comparison with authenticationdata. An “authentication instance” will refer to the data associatedwith an attempt to authenticate by an authentication technique.

[0193] The internal protocols and communications involved in the processof authenticating a user is described with reference to FIG. 10 above.The part of this process within which the context sensitiveauthentication takes place occurs within the comparison step shown asstep 1045 of FIG. 10. This step takes place within the authenticationengine 215 and involves assembling the enrollment data 410 retrievedfrom the depository 210 and comparing the authentication data providedby the user to it. One particular embodiment of this process is shown inFIG. 16 and described below.

[0194] The current authentication data provided by the user and theenrollment data retrieved from the depository 210 are received by theauthentication engine 215 in step 1600 of FIG. 16. Both of these sets ofdata may contain data which is related to separate techniques ofauthentication. The authentication engine 215 separates theauthentication data associated with each individual authenticationinstance in step 1605. This is necessary so that the authentication datais compared with the appropriate subset of the enrollment data for theuser (e.g. fingerprint authentication data should be compared withfingerprint enrollment data, rather than password enrollment data).

[0195] Generally, authenticating a user involves one or more individualauthentication instances, depending on which authentication techniquesare available to the user. These methods are limited by the enrollmentdata which were provided by the user during his enrollment process (ifthe user did not provide a retinal scan when enrolling, he will not beable to authenticate himself using a retinal scan), as well as the meanswhich may be currently available to the user (e.g. if the user does nothave a fingerprint reader at his current location, fingerprintauthentication will not be practical). In some cases, a singleauthentication instance may be sufficient to authenticate a user;however, in certain circumstances a combination of multipleauthentication instances may be used in order to more confidentlyauthenticate a user for a particular transaction.

[0196] Each authentication instance consists of data related to aparticular authentication technique (e.g. fingerprint, password, smartcard, etc.) and the circumstances which surround the capture anddelivery of the data for that particular technique. For example, aparticular instance of attempting to authenticate via password willgenerate not only the data related to the password itself, but alsocircumstantial data, known as “metadata”, related to that passwordattempt. This circumstantial data includes information such as: the timeat which the particular authentication instance took place, the networkaddress from which the authentication information was delivered, as wellas any other information as is known to those of skill in the art whichmay be determined about the origin of the authentication data (the typeof connection, the processor serial number, etc.).

[0197] In many cases, only a small amount of circumstantial metadatawill be available. For example, if the user is located on a networkwhich uses proxies or network address translation or another techniquewhich masks the address of the originating computer, only the address ofthe proxy or router may be determined. Similarly, in many casesinformation such as the processor serial number will not be availablebecause of either limitations of the hardware or operating system beingused, disabling of such features by the operator of the system, or otherlimitations of the connection between the user's system and the trustengine 110.

[0198] As shown in FIG. 16, once the individual authentication instancesrepresented within the authentication data are extracted and separatedin step 1605, the authentication engine 215 evaluates each instance forits reliability in indicating that the user is who he claims to be. Thereliability for a single authentication instance will generally bedetermined based on several factors. These may be grouped as factorsrelating to the reliability associated with the authenticationtechnique, which are evaluated in step 1610, and factors relating to thereliability of the particular authentication data provided, which areevaluated in step 1815. The first group includes without limitation theinherent reliability of the authentication technique being used, and thereliability of the enrollment data being used with that method. Thesecond group includes without limitation the degree of match between theenrollment data and the data provided with the authentication instance,and the metadata associated with that authentication instance. Each ofthese factors may vary independently of the others.

[0199] The inherent reliability of an authentication technique is basedon how hard it is for an imposter to provide someone else's correctdata, as well as the overall error rates for the authenticationtechnique. For passwords and knowledge based authentication methods,this reliability is often fairly low because there is nothing thatprevents someone from revealing their password to another person and forthat second person to use that password. Even a more complex knowledgebased system may have only moderate reliability since knowledge may betransferred from person to person fairly easily. Token basedauthentication, such as having a proper smart card or using a particularterminal to perform the authentication, is similarly of low reliabilityused by itself, since there is no guarantee that the right person is inpossession of the proper token.

[0200] However, biometric techniques are more inherently reliablebecause it is generally difficult to provide someone else with theability to use your fingerprints in a convenient manner, evenintentionally. Because subverting biometric authentication techniques ismore difficult, the inherent reliability of biometric methods isgenerally higher than that of purely knowledge or token basedauthentication techniques. However, even biometric techniques may havesome occasions in which a false acceptance or false rejection isgenerated. These occurrences may be reflected by differing reliabilitiesfor different implementations of the same biometric technique. Forexample, a fingerprint matching system provided by one company mayprovide a higher reliability than one provided by a different companybecause one uses higher quality optics or a better scanning resolutionor some other improvement which reduces the occurrence of falseacceptances or false rejections.

[0201] Note that this reliability may be expressed in different manners.The reliability is desirably expressed in some metric which can be usedby the heuristics 530 and algorithms of the authentication engine 215 tocalculate the confidence level of each authentication. One preferredmode of expressing these reliabilities is as a percentage or fraction.For instance, fingerprints might be assigned an inherent reliability of97%, while passwords might only be assigned an inherent reliability of50%. Those of skill in the art will recognize that these particularvalues are merely exemplary and may vary between specificimplementations.

[0202] The second factor for which reliability must be assessed is thereliability of the enrollment. This is part of the “graded enrollment”process referred to above. This reliability factor reflects thereliability of the identification provided during the initial enrollmentprocess. For instance, if the individual initially enrolls in a mannerwhere they physically produce evidence of their identity to a notary orother public official, and enrollment data is recorded at that time andnotarized, the data will be more reliable than data which is providedover a network during enrollment and only vouched for by a digitalsignature or other information which is not truly tied to theindividual.

[0203] Other enrollment techniques with varying levels of reliabilityinclude without limitation: enrollment at a physical office of the trustengine 110 operator; enrollment at a user's place of employment;enrollment at a post office or passport office; enrollment through anaffiliated or trusted party to the trust engine 110 operator; anonymousor pseudonymous enrollment in which the enrolled identity is not yetidentified with a particular real individual, as well as such othermeans as are known in the art.

[0204] These factors reflect the trust between the trust engine 110 andthe source of identification provided during the enrollment process. Forinstance, if enrollment is performed in association with an employerduring the initial process of providing evidence of identity, thisinformation may be considered extremely reliable for purposes within thecompany, but may be trusted to a lesser degree by a government agency,or by a competitor. Therefore, trust engines operated by each of theseother organizations may assign different levels of reliability to thisenrollment.

[0205] Similarly, additional data which is submitted across a network,but which is authenticated by other trusted data provided during aprevious enrollment with the same trust engine 110 may be considered asreliable as the original enrollment data was, even though the latterdata were submitted across an open network. In such circumstances, asubsequent notarization will effectively increase the level ofreliability associated with the original enrollment data. In this wayfor example, an anonymous or pseudonymous enrollment may then be raisedto a full enrollment by demonstrating to some enrollment official theidentity of the individual matching the enrolled data.

[0206] The reliability factors discussed above are generally valueswhich may be determined in advance of any particular authenticationinstance. This is because they are based upon the enrollment and thetechnique, rather than the actual authentication. In one embodiment, thestep of generating reliability based upon these factors involves lookingup previously determined values for this particular authenticationtechnique and the enrollment data of the user. In a further aspect of anadvantageous embodiment of the present invention, such reliabilities maybe included with the enrollment data itself. In this way, these factorsare automatically delivered to the authentication engine 215 along withthe enrollment data sent from the depository 210.

[0207] While these factors may generally be determined in advance of anyindividual authentication instance, they still have an effect on eachauthentication instance which uses that particular technique ofauthentication for that user. Furthermore, although the values maychange over time (e.g. if the user re-enrolls in a more reliablefashion), they are not dependent on the authentication data itself. Bycontrast, the reliability factors associated with a single specificinstance's data may vary on each occasion. These factors, as discussedbelow, must be evaluated for each new authentication in order togenerate reliability scores in step 1815.

[0208] The reliability of the authentication data reflects the matchbetween the data provided by the user in a particular authenticationinstance and the data provided during the authentication enrollment.This is the fundamental question of whether the authentication datamatches the enrollment data for the individual the user is claiming tobe. Normally, when the data do not match, the user is considered to notbe successfully authenticated, and the authentication fails. The mannerin which this is evaluated may change depending on the authenticationtechnique used. The comparison of such data is performed by thecomparator 515 function of the authentication engine 215 as shown inFIG. 5.

[0209] For instance, matches of passwords are generally evaluated in abinary fashion. In other words, a password is either a perfect match, ora failed match. It is usually not desirable to accept as even a partialmatch a password which is close to the correct password if it is notexactly correct. Therefore, when evaluating a password authentication,the reliability of the authentication returned by the comparator 515 istypically either 100% (correct) or 0% (wrong), with no possibility ofintermediate values.

[0210] Similar rules to those for passwords are generally applied totoken based authentication methods, such as smart cards. This is becausehaving a smart card which has a similar identifier or which is similarto the correct one, is still just as wrong as having any other incorrecttoken. Therefore tokens tend also to be binary authenticators: a usereither has the right token, or he doesn't.

[0211] However, certain types of authentication data, such asquestionnaires and biometrics, are generally not binary authenticators.For example, a fingerprint may match a reference fingerprint to varyingdegrees. To some extent, this may be due to variations in the quality ofthe data captured either during the initial enrollment or in subsequentauthentications. (A fingerprint may be smudged or a person may have astill healing scar or burn on a particular finger.) In other instancesthe data may match less than perfectly because the information itself issomewhat variable and based upon pattern matching. (A voice analysis mayseem close but not quite right because of background noise, or theacoustics of the environment in which the voice is recorded, or becausethe person has a cold.) Finally, in situations where large amounts ofdata are being compared, it may simply be the case that much of the datamatches well, but some doesn't. (A ten-question questionnaire may haveresulted in eight correct answers to personal questions, but twoincorrect answers.) For any of these reasons, the match between theenrollment data and the data for a particular authentication instancemay be desirably assigned a partial match value by the comparator 515.In this way, the fingerprint might be said to be a 85% match, the voiceprint a 65% match, and the questionnaire an 80% match, for example.

[0212] This measure (degree of match) produced by the comparator 515 isthe factor representing the basic issue of whether an authentication iscorrect or not. However, as discussed above, this is only one of thefactors which may be used in determining the reliability of a givenauthentication instance. Note also that even though a match to somepartial degree may be determined, that ultimately, it may be desirableto provide a binary result based upon a partial match. In an alternatemode of operation, it is also possible to treat partial matches asbinary, i.e. either perfect (100%) or failed (0%) matches, based uponwhether or not the degree of match passes a particular threshold levelof match. Such a process may be used to provide a simple pass/fail levelof matching for systems which would otherwise produce partial matches.

[0213] Another factor to be considered in evaluating the reliability ofa given authentication instance concerns the circumstances under whichthe authentication data for this particular instance are provided. Asdiscussed above, the circumstances refer to the metadata associated witha particular authentication instance. This may include withoutlimitation such information as: the network address of theauthenticator, to the extent that it can be determined; the time of theauthentication; the mode of transmission of the authentication data(phone line, cellular, network, etc.); and the serial number of thesystem of the authenticator.

[0214] These factors can be used to produce a profile of the type ofauthentication that is normally requested by the user. Then, thisinformation can be used to assess reliability in at least two manners.One manner is to consider whether the user is requesting authenticationin a manner which is consistent with the normal profile ofauthentication by this user. If the user normally makes authenticationrequests from one network address during business days (when she is atwork) and from a different network address during evenings or weekends(when she is at home), an authentication which occurs from the homeaddress during the business day is less reliable because it is outsidethe normal authentication profile. Similarly, if the user normallyauthenticates using a fingerprint biometric and in the evenings, anauthentication which originates during the day using only a password isless reliable.

[0215] An additional way in which the circumstantial metadata can beused to evaluate the reliability of an instance of authentication is todetermine how much corroboration the circumstance provides that theauthenticator is the individual he claims to be. For instance, if theauthentication comes from a system with a serial number known to beassociated with the user, this is a good circumstantial indicator thatthe user is who they claim to be. Conversely, if the authentication iscoming from a network address which is known to be in Los Angeles whenthe user is known to reside in London, this is an indication that thisauthentication is less reliable based on its circumstances.

[0216] It is also possible that a cookie or other electronic data may beplaced upon the system being used by a user when they interact with avendor system or with the trust engine 110. This data is written to thestorage of the system of the user and may contain an identificationwhich may be read by a Web browser or other software on the user system.If this data is allowed to reside on the user system between sessions (a“persistent cookie”), it may be sent with the authentication data asfurther evidence of the past use of this system during authentication ofa particular user. In effect, the metadata of a given instance,particularly a persistent cookie, may form a sort of token basedauthenticator itself.

[0217] Once the appropriate reliability factors based on the techniqueand data of the authentication instance are generated as described abovein steps 1610 and 1615 respectively, they are used to produce an overallreliability for the authentication instance provided in step 1620. Onemeans of doing this is simply to express each reliability as apercentage and then to multiply them together.

[0218] For example, suppose the authentication data is being sent infrom a network address known to be the user's home computer completelyin accordance with the user's past authentication profile (100%), andthe technique being used is fingerprint identification (97%), and theinitial finger print data was roistered through the user's employer withthe trust engine 110 (90%), and the match between the authenticationdata and the original fingerprint template in the enrollment data isvery good (99%). The overall reliability of this authentication instancecould then be calculated as the product of these reliabilities: 100% *97% * 90% * 99%−86.4% reliability.

[0219] This calculated reliability represents the reliability of onesingle instance of authentication. The overall reliability of a singleauthentication instance may also be calculated using techniques whichtreat the different reliability factors differently, for example byusing formulas where different weights are assigned to each reliabilityfactor. Furthermore, those of skill in the art will recognize that theactual values used may represent values other than percentages and mayuse non-arithmetic systems. One embodiment may include a module used byan authentication requester to set the weights for each factor and thealgorithms used in establishing the overall reliability of theauthentication instance.

[0220] The authentication engine 215 may use the above techniques andvariations thereof to determine the reliability of a singleauthentication instance, indicated as step 1620. However, it may beuseful in many authentication situations for multiple authenticationinstances to be provided at the same time. For example, while attemptingto authenticate himself using the system of the present invention, auser may provide a user identification, fingerprint authentication data,a smart card, and a password. In such a case, three independentauthentication instances are being provided to the trust engine 110 forevaluation. Proceeding to step 1625, if the authentication engine 215determines that the data provided by the user includes more than oneauthentication instance, then each instance in turn will be selected asshown in step 1630 and evaluated as described above in steps 1610, 1615and 1620.

[0221] Note that many of the reliability factors discussed may vary fromone of these instances to another. For instance, the inherentreliability of these techniques is likely to be different, as well asthe degree of match provided between the authentication data and theenrollment data. Furthermore, the user may have provided enrollment dataat different times and under different circumstances for each of thesetechniques, providing different enrollment reliabilities for each ofthese instances as well. Finally, even though the circumstances underwhich the data for each of these instances is being submitted is thesame, the use of such techniques may each fit the profile of the userdifferently, and so may be assigned different circumstantialreliabilities. (For example, the user may normally use their passwordand fingerprint, but not their smart card.)

[0222] As a result, the final reliability for each of theseauthentication instances may be different from One another. However, byusing multiple instances together, the overall confidence level for theauthentication will tend to increase.

[0223] Once the authentication engine has performed steps 1610 through1620 for all of the authentication instances provided in theauthentication data, the reliability of each instance is used in step1635 to evaluate the overall authentication confidence level. Thisprocess of combining the individual authentication instancereliabilities into the authentication confidence level may be modeled byvarious methods relating the individual reliabilities produced, and mayalso address the particular interaction between some of theseauthentication techniques. (For example, multiple knowledge-basedsystems such as passwords may produce less confidence than a singlepassword and even a fairly weak biometric, such as a basic voiceanalysis.)

[0224] One means in which the authentication engine 215 may combine thereliabilities of multiple concurrent authentication instances togenerate a final confidence level is to multiply the unreliability ofeach instance to arrive at a total unreliability. The unreliability isgenerally the complementary percentage of the reliability. For example,a technique which is 84% reliable is 16% unreliable. The threeauthentication instances described above (fingerprint, smart card,password)which produce reliabilities of 86%, 75%, and 72% would havecorresponding unreliabilities of (100−86)%, (100−75)% and (100−72)%, or14%, 25%, and 28%, respectively. By multiplying these unreliabilities,we get a cumulative unreliability of 14%*25%*28%−0.98% unreliability,which corresponds to a reliability of 99.02%.

[0225] In an additional mode of operation, additional factors andheuristics 530 may be applied within the authentication engine 215 toaccount for the interdependence of various authentication techniques.For example, if someone has unauthorized access to a particular homecomputer, they probably have access to the phone line at that address aswell. Therefore, authenticating based on an originating phone number aswell as upon the serial number of the authenticating system does not addmuch to the overall confidence in the authentication. However, knowledgebased authentication is largely independent of token basedauthentication (i.e. if someone steals your cellular phone or keys, theyare no more likely to know your PIN or password than if they hadn't).

[0226] Furthermore, different vendors or other authentication requestersmay wish to weigh different aspects of the authentication differently.This may include the use of separate weighing factors or algorithms usedin calculating the reliability of individual instances as well as theuse of different means to evaluate authentication events with multipleinstances.

[0227] For instance, vendors for certain types of transactions, forinstance corporate email systems, may desire to authenticate primarilybased upon heuristics and other circumstantial data by default.Therefore, they may apply high weights to factors related to themetadata and other profile related information associated with thecircumstances surrounding authentication events. This arrangement couldbe used to ease the burden on users during normal operating hours, bynot requiring more from the user than that he be logged on to thecorrect machine during business hours. However, another vendor may weighauthentications coming from a particular technique most heavily, forinstance fingerprint matching, because of a policy decision that such atechnique is most suited to authentication for the particular vendor'spurposes.

[0228] Such varying weights may be defined by the authenticationrequestor in generating the authentication request and sent to the trustengine 110 with the authentication request in one mode of operation.Such options could also be set as preferences during an initialenrollment process for the authentication requester and stored withinthe authentication engine in another mode of operation.

[0229] Once the authentication engine 215 produces an authenticationconfidence level for the authentication data provided, this confidencelevel is used to complete the authentication request in step 1640, andthis information is forwarded from the authentication engine 215 to thetransaction engine 205 for inclusion in a message to the authenticationrequester.

[0230] The process described above is merely exemplary, and those ofskill in the art will recognize that the steps need not be performed inthe order shown or that only certain of the steps are desired to beperformed, or that a variety of combinations of steps may be desired.Furthermore, certain steps, such as the evaluation of the reliability ofeach authentication instance provided, may be carried out in parallelwith one another if circumstances permit.

[0231] In a further aspect of this invention, a method is provided toaccommodate conditions when the authentication confidence level producedby the process described above fails to meet the required trust level ofthe vendor or other party requiring the authentication. In circumstancessuch as these where a gap exists between the level of confidenceprovided and the level of trust desired, the operator of the trustengine 110 is in a position to provide opportunities for one or bothparties to provide alternate data or requirements in order to close thistrust gap. This process will be referred to as “trust arbitrage” herein.

[0232] Trust arbitrage may take place within a framework ofcryptographic authentication as described above with reference to FIGS.10 and 11. As shown therein, a vendor or other party will requestauthentication of a particular user in association with a particulartransaction. In one circumstance, the vendor simply requests anauthentication, either positive or negative, and after receivingappropriate data from the user, the trust engine 110 will provide such abinary authentication. In circumstances such as these, the degree ofconfidence required in order to secure a positive authentication isdetermined based upon preferences set within the trust engine 110.

[0233] However, it is also possible that the vendor may request aparticular level of trust in order to complete a particular transaction.This required level may be included with the authentication request(e.g. authenticate this user to 98% confidence) or may be determined bythe trust engine 110 based on other factors associated with thetransaction (i.e. authenticate this user as appropriate for thistransaction). One such factor might be the economic value of thetransaction. For transactions which have greater economic value, ahigher degree of trust may be required. Similarly, for transactions withhigh degrees of risk a high degree of trust may be required. Conversely,for transactions which are either of low risk or of low value, lowertrust levels may be required by the vendor or other authenticationrequestor.

[0234] The process of trust arbitrage occurs between the steps of thetrust engine 110 receiving the authentication data in step 1050 of FIG.10 and the return of an authentication result to the vendor in step 1055of FIG. 10. Between these steps, the process which leads to theevaluation of trust levels and the potential trust arbitrage occurs asshown in FIG. 17. In circumstances where simple binary authentication isperformed, the process shown in FIG. 17 reduces to having thetransaction engine 205 directly compare the authentication data providedwith the enrollment data for the identified user as discussed above withreference to FIG. 10, flagging any difference as a negativeauthentication.

[0235] As shown in FIG. 17, the first step after receiving the data instep 1050 is for the transaction engine 205 to determine the trust levelwhich is required for a positive authentication for this particulartransaction in step 1710. This step may be performed by one of severaldifferent methods. The required trust level may be specified to thetrust engine 110 by the authentication requester at the time when theauthentication request is made. The authentication requester may alsoset a preference in advance which is stored within the depository 210 orother storage which is accessible by the transaction engine 205. Thispreference may then be read and used each time an authentication requestis made by this authentication requester. The preference may also beassociated with a particular user as a security measure such that aparticular level of trust is always required in order to authenticatethat user, the user preference being stored in the depository 210 orother storage media accessible by the transaction engine 205. Therequired level may also be derived by the transaction engine 205 orauthentication engine 215 based upon information provided in theauthentication request, such as the value and risk level of thetransaction to be authenticated.

[0236] In one mode of operation, a policy management module or othersoftware which is used when generating the authentication request isused to specify the required degree of trust for the authentication ofthe transaction. This may be used to provide a series of rules to followwhen assigning the required level of trust based upon the policies whichare specified within the policy management module. One advantageous modeof operation is for such a module to be incorporated with the web serverof a vendor in order to appropriately determine required level of trustfor transactions initiated with the vendor's web server. In this way,transaction requests from users may be assigned a required trust levelin accordance with the policies of the vendor and such information maybe forwarded to the trust engine 110 along with the authenticationrequest.

[0237] This required trust level correlates with the degree of certaintythat the vendor wants to have that the individual authenticating is infact who he identifies himself as. For example, if the transaction isone where the vendor wants a fair degree of certainty because goods arechanging hands, the vendor may require a trust level of 85%. Forsituation where the vendor is merely authenticating the user to allowhim to view members only content or exercise privileges on a chat room,the downside risk may be small enough that the vendor requires only a60% trust level. However, to enter into a production contract with avalue of tens of thousands of dollars, the vendor may require a trustlevel of 99% or more.

[0238] This required trust level represents a metric to which the usermust authenticate himself in order to complete the transaction. If therequired trust level is 85% for example, the user must provideauthentication to the trust engine 110 sufficient for the trust engine110 to say with 85% confidence that the user is who they say they are.It is the balance between this required trust level and theauthentication confidence level which produces either a positiveauthentication (to the satisfaction of the vendor) or a possibility oftrust arbitrage.

[0239] As shown in FIG. 17, after the transaction engine 205 receivesthe required trust level, it compares in step 1720 the required trustlevel to the authentication confidence level which the authenticationengine 215 calculated for the current authentication (as discussed withreference to FIG. 16). If the authentication confidence level is higherthan the required trust level for the transaction in step 1730, then theprocess moves to step 1740 where a positive authentication for thistransaction is produced by the transaction engine 205. A message to thiseffect will then be inserted into the authentication results andreturned to the vendor by the transaction engine 205 as shown in step1055 (see FIG. 10).

[0240] However, if the authentication confidence level does not fulfillthe required trust level in step 1730, then a confidence gap exists forthe current authentication, and trust arbitrage is conducted in step1750. Trust arbitrage is described more completely with reference toFIG. 18 below. This process as described below takes place within thetransaction engine 205 of the trust engine 110. Because noauthentication or other cryptographic operations are needed to executetrust arbitrage (other than those required for the SSL communicationbetween the transaction engine 205 and other components), the processmay be performed outside the authentication engine 215. However, as willbe discussed below, any reevaluation of authentication data or othercryptographic or authentication events will require the transactionengine 205 to resubmit the appropriate data to the authentication engine215. Those of skill in the art will recognize that the trust arbitrageprocess could alternately be structured to take place partially orentirely within the authentication engine 215 itself.

[0241] As mentioned above, trust arbitrage is a process where the trustengine 110 mediates a negotiation between the vendor and user in anattempt to secure a positive authentication where appropriate. As shownin step 1805, the transaction engine 205 first determines whether or notthe current situation is appropriate for trust arbitrage. This may bedetermined based upon the circumstances of the authentication, e.g.whether this authentication has already been through multiple cycles ofarbitrage, as well as upon the preferences of either the vendor or user,as will be discussed further below.

[0242] In such circumstances where arbitrage is not possible, theprocess proceeds to step 1810 where the transaction engine 205 generatesa negative authentication and then inserts it into the authenticationresults which are sent to the vendor in step 1055 (see FIG. 10). Onelimit which may be advantageously used to prevent authentications frompending indefinitely is to set a time-out period from the initialauthentication request. In this way, any transaction which is notpositively authenticated within the time limit is denied furtherarbitrage and negatively authenticated. Those of skill in the art willrecognize that such a time limit may vary depending upon thecircumstances of the transaction and the desires of the user and vendor.Limitations may also be placed upon the number of attempts that may bemade at providing a successful authentication. Such limitations may behandled by an attempt limiter 535 as shown in FIG. 5.

[0243] If arbitrage is not prohibited in step 1805, the transactionengine 205 will then engage in negotiation with one or both of thetransacting parties. The transaction engine 205 may send a message tothe user requesting some form of additional authentication in order toboost the authentication confidence level produced as shown in step1820. In the simplest form, this may simply indicates thatauthentication was insufficient. A request to produce one or moreadditional authentication instances to improve the overall confidencelevel of the authentication may also be sent.

[0244] If the user provides some additional authentication instances instep 1825, then the transaction engine 205 adds these authenticationinstances to the authentication data for the transaction and forwards itto the authentication engine 215 as shown in step 1015 (see FIG. 10),and the authentication is reevaluated based upon both the pre-existingauthentication instances for this transaction and the newly providedauthentication instances.

[0245] An additional type of authentication may be a request from thetrust engine 110 to make some form of person-to-person contact betweenthe trust engine 110 operator (or a trusted associate) and the user, forexample, by phone call. This phone call or other non-computerauthentication can be used to provide personal contact with theindividual and also to conduct some form of questionnaire basedauthentication. This also may give the opportunity to verify anoriginating telephone number and potentially a voice analysis of theuser when he calls in. Even if no additional authentication data can beprovided, the additional context associated with the user's phone numbermay improve the reliability of the authentication context. Any reviseddata or circumstances based upon this phone call are fed into the trustengine 110 for use in consideration of the authentication request.

[0246] Additionally, in step 1820 the trust engine 110 may provide anopportunity for the user to purchase insurance, effectively buying amore confident authentication. The operator of the trust engine 110 may,at times, only want to make such an option available if the confidencelevel of the authentication is above a certain threshold to begin with.In effect, this user side insurance is a way for the trust engine 110 tovouch for the user when the authentication meets the normal requiredtrust level of the trust engine 110 for authentication, but does notmeet the required trust level of the vendor for this transaction. Inthis way, the user may still successfully authenticate to a very highlevel as may be required by the vendor, even though he only hasauthentication instances which produce confidence sufficient for thetrust engine 110.

[0247] This function of the trust engine 110 allows the trust engine 110to vouch for someone who is authenticated to the satisfaction of thetrust engine 110, but not of the vendor. This is analogous to thefunction performed by a notary in adding his signature to a document inorder to indicate to someone reading the document at a later time thatthe person whose signature appears on the document is in fact the personwho signed it. The signature of the notary testifies to the act ofsigning by the user. In the same way, the trust engine is providing anindication that the person transacting is who they say they are.

[0248] However, because the trust engine 110 is artificially boostingthe level of confidence provided by the user, there is a greater risk tothe trust engine 110 operator, since the user is not actually meetingthe required trust level of the vendor. The cost of the insurance isdesigned to offset the risk of a false positive authentication to thetrust engine 110 (who may be effectively notarizing the authenticationsof the user). The user pays the trust engine 110 operator to take therisk of authenticating to a higher level of confidence than has actuallybeen provided.

[0249] Because such an insurance system allows someone to effectivelybuy a higher confidence rating from the trust engine 110, both vendorsand users may wish to prevent the use of user side insurance in certaintransactions. Vendors may wish to limit positive authentications tocircumstances where they know that actual authentication data supportsthe degree of confidence which they require and so may indicate to thetrust engine 110 that user side insurance is not to be allowed.Similarly, to protect his online identity, a user may wish to preventthe use of user side insurance on his account, or may wish to limit itsuse to situations where the authentication confidence level without theinsurance is higher than a certain limit. This may be used as a securitymeasure to prevent someone from overhearing a password or stealing asmart card and using them to falsely authenticate to a low level ofconfidence, and then purchasing insurance to produce a very high levelof (false) confidence. These factors may be evaluated in determiningwhether user side insurance is allowed.

[0250] If user purchases insurance in step 1840, then the authenticationconfidence level is adjusted based upon the insurance purchased in step1845, and the authentication confidence level and required trust levelare again compared in step 1730 (see FIG. 17). The process continuesfrom there, and may lead to either a positive authentication in step1740 (see FIG. 17), or back into the trust arbitrage process in step1750 for either further arbitrage (if allowed) or a negativeauthentication in step 1810 if further arbitrage is prohibited.

[0251] In addition to sending a message to the user in step 1820, thetransaction engine 205 may also send a message to the vendor in step1830 which indicates that a pending authentication is currently belowthe required trust level. The message may also offer various options onhow to proceed to the vendor. One of these Options is to simply informthe vendor of what the current authentication confidence level is andask if the vendor wishes to maintain their current unfulfilled requiredtrust level. This may be beneficial because in some cases, the vendormay have independent means for authenticating the transaction or mayhave been using a default set of requirements which generally result ina higher required level being initially specified than is actuallyneeded for the particular transaction at hand.

[0252] For instance, it may be standard practice that all incomingpurchase order transactions with the vendor are expected to meet a 98%trust level. However, if an order was recently discussed by phonebetween the vendor and a long-standing customer, and immediatelythereafter the transaction is authenticated, but only to a 93%confidence level, the vendor may wish to simply lower the acceptancethreshold for this transaction, because the phone call effectivelyprovides additional authentication to the vendor. In certaincircumstances, the vendor may be willing to lower their required trustlevel, but not all the way to the level of the current authenticationconfidence. For instance, the vendor in the above example might considerthat the phone call prior to the order might merit a 4% reduction in thedegree of trust needed; however, this is still greater than the 93%confidence produced by the user.

[0253] If the vendor does adjust their required trust level in step1835, then the authentication confidence level produced by theauthentication and the required trust level are compared in step 1730(see FIG. 17). If the confidence level now exceeds the required trustlevel, a positive authentication may be generated in the transactionengine 205 in step 1740 (see FIG. 17). If not, further arbitrage may beattempted as discussed above if it is permitted.

[0254] In addition to requesting an adjustment to the required trustlevel, the transaction engine 205 may also offer vendor side insuranceto the vendor requesting the authentication. This insurance serves asimilar purpose to that described above for the user side insurance.Here, however, rather than the cost corresponding to the risk beingtaken by the trust engine 110 in authenticating above the actualauthentication confidence level produced, the cost of the insurancecorresponds to the risk being taken by the vendor in accepting a lowertrust level in the authentication.

[0255] Instead of just lowering their actual required trust level, thevendor has the option of purchasing insurance to protect itself from theadditional risk associated with a lower level of trust in theauthentication of the user. As described above, it may be advantageousfor the vendor to only consider purchasing such insurance to cover thetrust gap in conditions where the existing authentication is alreadyabove a certain threshold.

[0256] The availability of such vendor side insurance allows the vendorthe option to either: lower his trust requirement directly at noadditional cost to himself, bearing the risk of a false authenticationhimself (based on the lower trust level required); or, buying insurancefor the trust gap between the authentication confidence level and hisrequirement, with the trust engine 110 operator bearing the risk of thelower confidence level which has been provided. By purchasing theinsurance, the vendor effectively keeps his high trust levelrequirement; because the risk of a false authentication is shifted tothe trust engine 110 operator.

[0257] If the vendor purchases insurance in step 1840, theauthentication confidence level and required trust levels are comparedin step 1730 (see FIG. 17), and the process continues as describedabove.

[0258] Note that it is also possible that both the user and the vendorrespond to messages from the trust engine 110. Those of skill in the artwill recognize that there are multiple ways in which such situations canbe handled. One advantageous mode of handling the possibility ofmultiple responses is simply to treat the responses in a first-come,first-served manner. For example, if the vendor responds with a loweredrequired trust level and immediately thereafter the user also purchasesinsurance to raise his authentication level, the authentication is firstreevaluated based upon the lowered trust requirement from the vendor. Ifthe authentication is now positive, the user's insurance purchase isignored. In another advantageous mode of operation, the user might onlybe charged for the level of insurance required to meet the new, loweredtrust requirement of the vendor (if a trust gap remained even with thelowered vendor trust requirement).

[0259] If no response from either party is received during the trustarbitrage process at step 1850 within the time limit set for theauthentication, the arbitrage is reevaluated in step 1805. Thiseffectively begins the arbitrage process again. If the time limit wasfinal or other circumstances prevent further arbitrage in step 1805, anegative authentication is generated by the transaction engine 205 instep 1810 and returned to the vendor in step 1055 (see FIG. 10). If not,new messages may be sent to the user and vendor, and the process may berepeated as desired.

[0260] Note that for certain types of transactions, for instance,digitally signing documents which are not part of a transaction, theremay not necessarily be a vendor or other third party; therefore thetransaction is primarily between the user and the trust engine 110. Incircumstances such as these, the trust engine 110 will have its ownrequired trust level which must be satisfied in order to generate apositive authentication. However, in such circumstances, it will oftennot be desirable for the trust engine 110 to offer insurance to the userin order for him to raise the confidence of his own signature.

[0261] The process described above and shown in FIGS. 16-18 may becarried out using various communications modes as described above withreference to the trust engine 110. For instance, the messages may beweb-based and sent using SSL connections between the trust engine 110and applets downloaded in real time to browsers running on the user orvendor systems. In an alternate mode of operation, certain dedicatedapplications may be in use by the user and vendor which facilitate sucharbitrage and insurance transactions. In another alternate mode ofoperation, secure email operations may be used to mediate the arbitragedescribed above, thereby allowing deferred evaluations and batchprocessing of authentications. Those of skill in the art will recognizethat different communications modes may be used as are appropriate forthe circumstances and authentication requirements of the vendor.

[0262] The following description with reference to FIG. 19 describes asample transaction which integrates the various aspects of the presentinvention as described above. This example illustrates the overallprocess between a user and a vendor as mediates by the trust engine 110.Although the various steps and components as described in detail abovemay be used to carry out the following transaction, the processillustrated focuses on the interaction between the trust engine 110,user and vendor.

[0263] The transaction begins when the user, while viewing web pagesonline, fills out an order form on the web site of the vendor in step1900. The user wishes to submit this order form to the vendor, signedwith his digital signature. In order to do this, the user submits theorder form with his request for a signature to the trust engine 110 instep 1905. The user will also provide authentication data which will beused as described above to authenticate his identity.

[0264] In step 1910 the authentication data is compared to theenrollment data by the trust engine 110 as discussed above, and if apositive authentication is produced, the hash of the order form, signedwith the private key of the user, is forwarded to the vendor along withthe order form itself.

[0265] The vendor receives the signed form in step 1915, and then thevendor will generate an invoice or other contract related to thepurchase to be made in step 1920. This contract is sent back to the userwith a request for a signature in step 1925. The vendor also sends anauthentication request for this contract transaction to the trust engine110 in step 1930 including a hash of the contract which will be signedby both parties. To allow the contract to be digitally signed by bothparties, the vendor also includes authentication data for itself so thatthe vendor's signature upon the contract can later be verified ifnecessary.

[0266] As discussed above, the trust engine 110 then verifies theauthentication data provided by the vendor to confirm the vendor'sidentity, and if the data produces a positive authentication in step1935, continues with step 1955 when the data is received from the user.If the vendor's authentication data does not match the enrollment dataof the vendor to the desired degree, a message is returned to the vendorrequesting further authentication. Trust arbitrage may be performed hereif necessary, as described above, in order for the vendor tosuccessfully authenticate itself to the trust engine 110.

[0267] When the user receives the contract in step 1940, he reviews it,generates authentication data to sign it if it is acceptable in step1945, and then sends a hash of the contract and his authentication datato the trust engine 110 in step 1950. The trust engine 110 verifies theauthentication data in step 1955 and if the authentication is good,proceeds to process the contract as described below. As discussed abovewith reference to FIGS. 17 and 18, trust arbitrage may be performed asappropriate to close any trust gap which exists between theauthentication confidence level and the required authentication levelfor the transaction.

[0268] The trust engine 110 signs the hash of the contract with theuser's private key, and sends this signed hash to the vendor in step1960, signing the complete message on its own behalf, i.e., including ahash of the complete message (including the user's signature) encryptedwith the private key 510 of the trust engine 110. This message isreceived by the vendor in step 1965. The message represents a signedcontract (hash of contract encrypted using user's private key) and areceipt from the trust engine 110 (the hash of the message including thesigned contract, encrypted using the trust engine 110's private key).

[0269] The trust engine 110 similarly prepares a hash of the contractwith the vendor's private key in step 1970, and forwards this to theuser, signed by the trust engine 110. In this way, the user alsoreceives a copy of the contract, signed by the vendor, as well as areceipt, signed by the trust engine 110, for delivery of the signedcontract in step 1975.

[0270] In addition to the foregoing, an additional aspect of theinvention provides a cryptographic Service Provider Module (SPM) whichmay be available to a client side application as a means to accessfunctions provided by the trust engine 110 described above. Oneadvantageous way to provide such a service is for the cryptographic SPMis to mediate communications between a third party ApplicationProgramming Interface (API) and a trust engine 110 which is accessiblevia a network or other remote connection. A sample cryptographic SPM isdescribed below with reference to FIG. 20.

[0271] For example, on a typical system, a number of API's are availableto programmers. Each API provides a set of function calls which may bemade by an application 2000 running upon the system. Examples of API'swhich provide programming interfaces suitable for cryptographicfunctions, authentication functions, and other security function includethe Cryptographic API (CAPI) 2010 provided by Microsoft with its Windowsoperating systems, and the Common Data Security Architecture (CDSA),sponsored by IBM, Intel and other members of the Open Group. CAPI willbe used as an exemplary security API in the discussion that follows.However, the cryptographic SPM described could be used with CDSA orother security API's as are known in the art.

[0272] This API is used by a user system 105 or vendor system 120 when acall is made for a cryptographic function. Included among thesefunctions may be requests associated with performing variouscryptographic operations, such as encrypting a document with aparticular key, signing a document, requesting a digital certificate,verifying a signature upon a signed document, and such othercryptographic functions as are described herein or known to those ofskill in the art.

[0273] Such cryptographic functions are normally performed locally tothe system upon which CAPI 2010 is located. This is because generallythe functions called require the use of either resources of the localuser system 105, such as a fingerprint reader, or software functionswhich are programmed using libraries which are executed on the localmachine. Access to these local resources is normally provided by one ormore Service Provider Modules (SPM's) 2015, 2020 as referred to abovewhich provide resources with which the cryptographic functions arecarried out. Such SPM's may include software libraries 2015 to performencrypting or decrypting operations, or drivers and applications 2020which are capable of accessing specialized hardware 2025, such asbiometric scanning devices. In much the way that CAPI 2010 providesfunctions which may be used by an application 2000 of the system 105,the SPM's 2015, 2020 provide CAPI with access to the lower levelfunctions and resources associated with the available services upon thesystem.

[0274] In accordance with the invention, it is possible to provide acryptographic SPM 2030 which is capable of accessing the cryptographicfunctions provided by the trust engine 110 and making these functionsavailable to an application 2000 through CAPI 2010. Unlike embodimentswhere CAPI 2010 is only able to access resources which are locallyavailable through SPM's 2015, 2020, a cryptographic SPM 2030 asdescribed herein would be able to submit requests for cryptographicoperations to a remotely-located, network-accessible trust engine 110 inorder to perform the operations desired.

[0275] For instance, if an application 2000 has a need for acryptographic operation, such as signing a document, the application2000 makes a function call to the appropriate CAPI 2010 function. CAPI2010 in turn will execute this function, making use of the resourceswhich are made available to it by the SPM's 2015, 2020 and thecryptographic SPM 2030. In the case of a digital signature function, thecryptographic SPM 2030 will generate an appropriate request which willbe sent to the trust engine 110 across the communication link 125.

[0276] The operations which occur between the cryptographic SPM 2030 andthe trust engine 110 are the same operations that would be possiblebetween any other system and the trust engine 110. However, thesefunctions are effectively made available to a user system 105 throughCAPI 2010 such that they appear to be locally available upon the usersystem 105 itself. However, unlike ordinary SPM's 2015, 2020, thefunctions are being carried out on the remote trust engine 110 and theresults relayed to the cryptographic SPM 2030 in response to appropriaterequests across the communication link 125.

[0277] This cryptographic SPM 2030 makes a number of operationsavailable to the user system 105 or a vendor system 120 which might nototherwise be available. These functions include without limitation:encryption and decryption of documents; issuance of digitalcertificates; digital signing of documents; verification of digitalsignatures; and such other operations as will be apparent to those ofskill in the art.

[0278] In a separate embodiment, the present invention comprises acomplete system for performing the data securing methods of the presentinvention on any data set. The computer system of this embodimentcomprises a data splitting module that comprises the functionality shownin FIG. 8 and described herein. In one embodiment of the presentinvention, the data splitting module comprises a parser program orsoftware suite which comprises data splitting, encryption anddecryption, reconstitution or reassembly functionality. This embodimentmay further comprise a data storage facility or multiple data storagefacilities, as well. The data splitting module, or parser, comprises across-platform software module suite which integrates within anelectronic infrastructure, or as an add-on to any application whichrequires the ultimate security of its data elements. This parsingprocess operates on any type of data set, and on any and all file types,or in a database on any row, column or cell of data in that database.

[0279] The parsing process of the present invention may, in oneembodiment, be designed in a modular tiered fashion, and any encryptionprocess is suitable for use in the process of the present invention. Themodular tiers of the parsing process of the present invention mayinclude, but are not limited to, 1) cryptographic split, dispersed andsecurely stored in multiple locations; 2) encrypt, cryptographicallysplit, dispersed and securely stored in multiple locations; 3) encrypt,cryptographically split, encrypt each share, then dispersed and securelystored in multiple locations; and 4) encrypt, cryptographically split,encrypt each share with a different type of encryption than was used inthe first step, then dispersed and securely stored in multiplelocations.

[0280] The process comprises, in one embodiment, splitting of the dataaccording to the contents of a generated random number, or key andperforming the same cryptographic splitting of the key used in theencryption of splitting of the data to be secured into two or moreportions, or shares, of parsed data, and in one embodiment, preferablyinto four or more portions of parsed data, encrypting all of theportions, then scattering and storing these portions back into thedatabase, or relocating them to any named device, fixed or removable,depending on the requestor's need for privacy and security.Alternatively, in another embodiment, encryption may occur prior to thesplitting of the data set by the splitting module or parser. Theoriginal data processed as described in this embodiment is encrypted andobfuscated and is secured. The dispersion of the encrypted elements, ifdesired, can be virtually anywhere, including, but not limited to, asingle server or data storage device, or among separate data storagefacilities or devices. Encryption key management in one embodiment maybe included within the software suite, or in another embodiment may beintegrated into an existing infrastructure or any other desiredlocation.

[0281] A cryptographic split (cryptosplit) partitions the data into Nnumber of shares. The partitioning can be on any size unit of data,including an individual bit, bits, bytes, kilobytes, megabytes, orlarger units, as well as any pattern or combination of data unit sizeswhether predetermined or randomly generated. The units can also be ofdifferent sized, based on either a random or predetermined set ofvalues. This means the data can be viewed as a sequence of these units.In this manner the size of the data units themselves may render the datamore secure, for example by using one or more predetermined or randomlygenerated pattern, sequence or combination of data unit sizes. The unitsare then distributed (either randomly or by a predetermined set ofvalues) into the N shares. This distribution could also involve ashuffling of the order of the units in the shares. It is readilyapparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that the distribution ofthe data units into the shares may be performed according to a widevariety of possible selections, including but not limited to size-fixed,predetermined sizes, or one or more combination, pattern or sequence ofdata unit sizes that are predetermined or randomly generated.

[0282] One example of this cryptographic split process, or cryptosplit,would be to consider the data to be 23 bytes in size, with the data unitsize chosen to be one byte, and with the number of shares selected to be4. Each byte would be distributed into one of the 4 shares. Assuming arandom distribution, a key would be obtained to create a sequence of 23random numbers (r1, r2, r3 through r23), each with a value between 1 and4 corresponding to the four shares. Each of the units of data (in thisexample 23 individual bytes of data) is associated with one of the 23random numbers corresponding to one of the four shares. The distributionof the bytes of data into the four shares would occur by placing thefirst byte of the data into share number r1, byte two into share r2,byte three into share r3, through the 23^(rd) byte of data into sharer23. It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that awide variety of other possible steps or combination or sequence ofsteps, including the size of the data units, may be used in thecryptosplit process of the present invention, and the above example is anon-limiting description of one process for cryptosplitting data. Torecreate the original data, the reverse operation would be performed.

[0283] In another embodiment of the cryptosplit process of the presentinvention, an option for the cryptosplitting process is to providesufficient redundancy in the shares such that only a subset of theshares are needed to reassemble or restore the data to its original oruseable form. As a non-limiting example, the cryptosplit may be done asa “3 of 4” cryptosplit such that only three of the four shares arenecessary to reassemble or restore the data to its original or useableform. This is also referred to as a “M of N cryptosplit” wherein N isthe total number of shares, and M is at least one less than N. It isreadily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that there aremany possibilities for creating this redundancy in the cryptosplittingprocess of the present invention.

[0284] In one embodiment of the cryptosplitting process of the presentinvention, each unit of data is stored in two shares, the primary shareand the backup share. Using the “3 of 4” cryptosplitting processdescribed above, any one share can be missing, and this is sufficient toreassemble or restore the original data with no missing data units sinceonly three of the total four shares are required. As described herein, arandom number is generated that corresponds to one of the shares. Therandom number is associated with a data unit, and stored in thecorresponding share, based on a key. One key is used, in thisembodiment, to generate the primary and backup share random number. Asdescribed herein for the cryptosplitting process of the presentinvention, a set of random numbers (also referred to as primary sharenumbers) from 0 to 3 are generated equal to the number of data units.Then another set of random numbers is generated (also referred to asbackup share numbers) from 1 to 3 equal to the number of data units.Each unit of data is then associated with a primary share number and abackup share number. Alternatively, a set of random numbers may begenerated that is fewer than the number of data units, and repeating therandom number set, but this may reduce the security of the sensitivedata. The primary share number is used to determine into which share thedata unit is stored. The backup share number is combined with theprimary share number to create a third share number between 0 and 3, andthis number is used to determine into which share the data unit isstored. In this example, the equation to determine the third sharenumber is:

[0285] (primary share number+backup share number) MOD 4=third sharenumber.

[0286] In the embodiment described above where the primary share numberis between 0 and 3, and the backup share number is between 1 and 3ensures that the third share number is different from the primary sharenumber. This results in the data unit being stored in two differentshares. It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the artthat there are many ways of performing redundant cryptosplitting andnon-redundant cryptosplitting in addition to the embodiments disclosedherein. For example, the data units in each share could be shuffledutilizing a different algorithm. This data unit shuffling may beperformed as the original data is split into the data units, or afterthe data units are placed into the shares, or after the share is full,for example.

[0287] The various cryptosplitting processes and data shufflingprocesses described herein, and all other embodiments of thecryptosplitting and data shuffling methods of the present invention maybe performed on data units of any size, including but not limited to, assmall as an individual bit, bits, bytes, kilobytes, megabytes or larger.

[0288] An example of one embodiment of source code that would performthe cryptosplitting process described herein is: DATA [1:24] - array ofbytes with the data to be split SHARES[0:3; 1:24] - 2-dimensionalarraywith each row representing one of the shares RANDOM[1:24] - array randomnumbers in the range of 0..3 S1 = 1; S2 = 1; S3 = 1; S4 = 1; For J = 1to 24 do Begin IF RANDOM[J[ ==0 then Begin SHARES[1,S1] = DATA [J] ; S1= S1 + 1; End ELSE IF RANDOM[J[ ==1 then Begin SHARES[2,S2] = DATA [J] ;S2 = S2 + 1; END ELSE IF RANDOM[J[ ==2 then Begin Shares[3,S3] = data[J] ; S3 = S3 + 1; End Else begin Shares[4,S4] = data [J] ; S4 = S4 + 1;End; END;

[0289] An example of one embodiment of source code that would performthe cryptosplitting RAID process described herein is:

[0290] Generate two sets of numbers, PrimaryShare is 0 to 3, BackupShareis 1 to 3. Then put each data unit into share [primaryshare [1]] andshare[(primaryshare[1]+backupshare[1]) mod 4, with the same process asin cryptosplitting described above. This method will be scalable to anysize N, where only N−1 shares are necessary to restore the data.

[0291] The retrieval, recombining, reassembly or reconstituting of theencrypted data elements may utilize any number of authenticationtechniques, including, but not limited to, biometrics, such asfingerprint recognition, facial scan, hand scan, iris scan, retinalscan, ear scan, vascular pattern recognition or DNA analysis. The datasplitting or parser modules of the present invention may be integratedinto a wide variety of infrastructure products or applications asdesired.

[0292] Traditional encryption technologies known in the art rely on oneor more key used to encrypt the data and render it unusable without thekey. The data, however, remains whole and intact and subject to attack.The parser software suite of the present invention, in one embodiment,addresses this problem by performing a cryptographic split or parsing ofthe encrypted file into two or more portions or shares, and in anotherembodiment, preferably four or more shares, adding another layer ofencryption to each share of the data, then storing the shares indifferent physical and/or logical locations. When one or more datashares are physically removed from the system, either by using aremovable device, such as a data storage device, or by placing the shareunder another party's control, any possibility of compromise of secureddata is effectively removed.

[0293] An example of one embodiment of the parser software suite of thepresent invention and an example of how it may be utilized is shown inFIG. 21 and described below. However, it is readily apparent to those ofordinary skill in the art that the parser software suite of the presentinvention may be utilized in a wide variety of ways in addition to thenon-limiting example below. As a deployment option, and in oneembodiment, the parser may be implemented with external session keymanagement or secure internal storage of session keys. Uponimplementation, a Parser Master Key will be generated which will be usedfor securing the application and for encryption purposes. It should bealso noted that the incorporation of the Parser Master key in theresulting secured data allows for a flexibility of sharing of secureddata by individuals within a workgroup, enterprise or extended audience.

[0294] As shown in FIG. 21, this embodiment of the present inventionshows the steps of the process performed by the parser software suite ondata to store the session master key with the parsed data:

[0295] 1. Generating a session master key and encrypt the data using RS1stream cipher.

[0296] 2. Separating the resulting encrypted data into four shares orportions of parsed data according to the pattern of the session masterkey.

[0297] 3. In this embodiment of the method, the session master key willbe stored along with the secured data shares in a data depository.Separating the session master key according to the pattern of the ParserMaster Key and append the key data to the encrypted parsed data.

[0298] 4. The resulting four shares of data will contain encryptedportions of the original data and portions of the session master key.Generate a stream cipher key for each of the four data shares.

[0299] 5. Encrypting each share, then store the encryption keys indifferent locations from the encrypted data portions or shares: Share 1gets Key 4, Share 2 gets Key 1, Share 3 gets Key 2, Share 4 gets Key 3.

[0300] To restore the original data format, the steps are reversed.

[0301] It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art thatcertain steps of the methods described herein may be performed indifferent order, or repeated multiple times, as desired. It is alsoreadily apparent to those skilled in the art that the portions of thedata may be handled differently from one another. For example, multipleparsing steps may be performed on only one portion of the parsed data.Each portion of parsed data may be uniquely secured in any desirable wayprovided only that the data may be reassembled, reconstituted, reformed,decrypted or restored to its original or other usable form.

[0302] As shown in FIG. 22 and described herein, another embodiment ofthe present invention comprises the steps of the process performed bythe parser software suite on data to store the session master key datain one or more separate key management table:

[0303] 1. Generating a session master key and encrypt the data using RS1stream cipher.

[0304] 2. Separating the resulting encrypted data into four shares orportions of parsed data according to the pattern of the session masterkey.

[0305] 3. In this embodiment of the method of the present invention, thesession master key will be stored in a separate key management table ina data depository. Generating a unique transaction ID for thistransaction. Storing the transaction ID and session master key in aseparate key management table. Separating the transaction ID accordingto the pattern of the Parser Master Key and append the data to theencrypted parsed or separated data.

[0306] 4. The resulting four shares of data will contain encryptedportions of the original data and portions of the transaction ID.

[0307] 5. Generating a stream cipher key for each of the four datashares.

[0308] 6. Encrypting each share, then store the encryption keys indifferent locations from the encrypted data portions or shares: Share 1gets Key 4, Share 2 gets Key 1, Share 3 gets Key 2, Share 4 gets Key 3.

[0309] To restore the original data format, the steps are reversed.

[0310] It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art thatcertain steps of the method described herein may be performed indifferent order, or repeated multiple times, as desired. It is alsoreadily apparent to those skilled in the art that the portions of thedata may be handled differently from one another. For example, multipleseparating or parsing steps may be performed on only one portion of theparsed data. Each portion of parsed data may be uniquely secured in anydesirable way provided only that the data may be reassembled,reconstituted, reformed, decrypted or restored to its original or otherusable form.

[0311] As shown in FIG. 23, this embodiment of the present inventionshows the steps of the process performed by the parser software suite ondata to store the session master key with the parsed data:

[0312] 1. Accessing the parser master key associated with theauthenticated user

[0313] 2. Generating a unique Session Master key

[0314] 3. Derive an Intermediary Key from an exclusive OR function ofthe Parser Master Key and Session Master key

[0315] 4. Optional encryption of the data using an existing or newencryption algorithm keyed with the Intermediary Key.

[0316] 5. Separating the resulting optionally encrypted data into fourshares or portions of parsed data according to the pattern of theIntermediary key.

[0317] 6. In this embodiment of the method, the session master key willbe stored along with the secured data shares in a data depository.Separating the session master key according to the pattern of the ParserMaster Key and append the key data to the optionally encrypted parseddata shares.

[0318] 7. The resulting multiple shares of data will contain optionallyencrypted portions of the original data and portions of the sessionmaster key.

[0319] 8. Optionally generate an encryption key for each of the fourdata shares.

[0320] 9. Optionally encrypting each share with an existing or newencryption algorithm, then store the encryption keys in differentlocations from the encrypted data portions or shares: for example, Share1 gets Key 4, Share 2 gets Key 1, Share 3 gets Key 2, Share 4 gets Key3.

[0321] To restore the original data format, the steps are reversed.

[0322] It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art thatcertain steps of the methods described herein may be performed indifferent order, or repeated multiple times, as desired. It is alsoreadily apparent to those skilled in the art that the portions of thedata may be handled differently from one another. For example, multipleparsing steps may be performed on only one portion of the parsed data.Each portion of parsed data may be uniquely secured in any desirable wayprovided only that the data may be reassembled, reconstituted, reformed,decrypted or restored to its original or other usable form.

[0323] As shown in FIG. 24 and described herein, another embodiment ofthe present invention comprises the steps of the process performed bythe parser software suite on data to store the session master key datain one or more separate key management table:

[0324] 1. Accessing the Parser Master Key associated with theauthenticated user

[0325] 2. Generating a unique Session Master Key

[0326] 3. Derive an Intermediary Key from an exclusive OR function ofthe Parser Master Key and Session Master key

[0327] 4. Optionally encrypt the data using an existing or newencryption algorithm keyed with the Intermediary Key.

[0328] 5. Separating the resulting optionally encrypted data into fourshares or portions of parsed data according to the pattern of theIntermediary Key.

[0329] 6. In this embodiment of the method of the present invention, thesession master key will be stored in a separate key management table ina data depository. Generating a unique transaction ID for thistransaction. Storing the transaction ID and session master key in aseparate key management table or passing the Session Master Key andtransaction ID back to the calling program for external management.Separating the transaction ID according to the pattern of the ParserMaster Key and append the data to the optionally encrypted parsed orseparated data.

[0330] 7. The resulting four shares of data will contain optionallyencrypted portions of the original data and portions of the transactionID.

[0331] 8. Optionally generate an encryption key for each of the fourdata shares.

[0332] 9. Optionally encrypting each share, then store the encryptionkeys in different locations from the encrypted data portions or shares.For example: Share 1 gets Key 4, Share 2 gets Key 1, Share 3 gets Key 2,Share 4 gets Key 3.

[0333] To restore the original data format, the steps are reversed.

[0334] It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art thatcertain steps of the method described herein may be performed indifferent order, or repeated multiple times, as desired. It is alsoreadily apparent to those skilled in the art that the portions of thedata may be handled differently from one another. For example, multipleseparating or parsing steps may be performed on only one portion of theparsed data. Each portion of parsed data may be uniquely secured in anydesirable way provided only that the data may be reassembled,reconstituted, reformed, decrypted or restored to its original or otherusable form.

[0335] A wide variety of encryption methodologies are suitable for usein the methods of the present invention, as is readily apparent to thoseskilled in the art. The One Time Pad algorithm, is often considered oneof the most secure encryption methods, and is suitable for use in themethod of the present invention. Using the One Time Pad algorithmrequires that a key be generated which is as long as the data to besecured. The use of this method may be less desirable in certaincircumstances such as those resulting in the generation and managementof very long keys because of the size of the data set to be secured. Inthe One-Time Pad (OTP) algorithm, the simple exclusive-or function, XOR,is used. For two binary streams x and y of the same length, x XOR ymeans the bitwise exclusive-or of x and y.

[0336] At the bit level is generated:

[0337] 0 XOR 0=0

[0338] 0 XOR 1=1

[0339] 1 XOR 0=1

[0340] 1 XOR 1=0

[0341] An example of this process is described herein for an n-bytesecret, s, (or data set) to be split. The process will generate ann-byte random value, a, and then set:

[0342] b=a XOR s.

[0343] Note that one can derive “s” via the equation:

[0344] s=a XOR b.

[0345] The values a and b are referred to as shares or portions and areplaced in separate depositories. Once the secret s is split into two ormore shares, it is discarded in a secure manner.

[0346] The parser software suite of the present invention may utilizethis function, performing multiple XOR functions incorporating multipledistinct secret key values: K1, K2, K3, Kn, K5. At the beginning of theoperation, the data to be secured is passed through the first encryptionoperation, secure data=data XOR secret key 5:

[0347] S=D XOR K5

[0348] In order to securely store the resulting encrypted data in, forexample, four shares, S1, S2, S3, Sn, the data is parsed into “n”segments, or shares, according to the value of K5. This operationresults in “n” pseudorandom shares of the original encrypted data.Subsequent XOR functions may then be performed on each share with theremaining secret key values, for example: Secure data segment1=encrypted data share 1 XOR secret key 1:

[0349] SD1=S1 XOR K1

[0350] SD2=S2 XOR K2

[0351] SD3=S3 XOR K3

[0352] SDn=Sn XOR Kn.

[0353] In one embodiment, it may not be desired to have any onedepository contain enough information to decrypt the information heldthere, so the key required to decrypt the share is stored in a differentdata depository:

[0354] Depository 1: SD1, Kn

[0355] Depository 2: SD2, K1

[0356] Depository 3: SD3, K2

[0357] Depository n: SDn, K3.

[0358] Additionally, appended to each share may be the informationrequired to retrieve the original session encryption key, K5. Therefore,in the key management example described herein, the original sessionmaster key is referenced by a transaction ID split into “n” sharesaccording to the contents of the installation dependant Parser MasterKey (TID1, TID2, TID3, TIDn):

[0359] Depository 1: SD1, Kn, TID1

[0360] Depository 2: SD2, K1, TID2

[0361] Depository 3: SD3, K2, TID3

[0362] Depository n: SDn, K3, TIDn.

[0363] In the incorporated session key example described herein, thesession master key is split into “n” shares according to the contents ofthe installation dependant Parser Master Key (SK1, SK2, SK3, SKn):

[0364] Depository 1: SD1, Kn, SK1

[0365] Depository 2: SD2, K1, SK2

[0366] Depository 3: SD3, K2, SK3

[0367] Depository n: SDn, K3, SKn.

[0368] Unless all four shares are retrieved, the data cannot bereassembled according to this example. Even if all four shares arecaptured, there is no possibility of reassembling or restoring theoriginal information without access to the session master key and theParser Master Key.

[0369] This example has described an embodiment of the method of thepresent invention, and also describes, in another embodiment, thealgorithm used to place shares into depositories so that shares from alldepositories can be combined to form the secret authentication material.The computations needed are very simple and fast. However, with the OneTime Pad (OTP) algorithm there may be circumstances that cause it to beless desirable, such as a large data set to be secured, because the keysize is the same size as the data to be stored. Therefore, there wouldbe a need to store and transmit about twice the amount of the originaldata which may be less desirable under certain circumstances.

[0370] Stream Cipher RS1

[0371] The stream cipher RS1 splitting technique is very similar to theOTP splitting technique described herein. Instead of an n-byte randomvalue, an n′=min(n, 16)-byte random value is generated and used to keythe RS1 Stream Cipher algorithm. The advantage of the RS1 Stream Cipheralgorithm is that a pseudorandom key is generated from a much smallerseed number. The speed of execution of the RS1 Stream Cipher encryptionis also rated at approximately 10 times the speed of the well known inthe art Triple DES encryption without compromising security. The RS1Stream Cipher algorithm is well known in the art, and may be used togenerate the keys used in the XOR function. The RS1 Stream Cipheralgorithm is interoperable with other commercially available streamcipher algorithms, such as the RC4™ stream cipher algorithm of RSASecurity, Inc and is suitable for use in the methods of the presentinvention.

[0372] Using the key notation above, K1 thru K5 are now an n′ byterandom values and we set:

[0373] SD1=S1 XORE(K1)

[0374] SD2=S2 XOR E(K2)

[0375] SD3=S3 XOR E(K3)

[0376] SDn=Sn XOR E(Kn)

[0377] where E(K1) thru E(Kn) are the first n′ bytes of output from theRS1 Stream Cipher algorithm keyed by K1 thru Kn. The shares are nowplaced into data depositories as described herein.

[0378] In this stream cipher RS1 algorithm, the required computationsneeded are nearly as simple and fast as the OTP algorithm. The benefitin this example using the RS1 Stream Cipher is that the system needs tostore and transmit on average only about 16 bytes more than the size ofthe original data to be secured per share. When the size of the originaldata is more than 16 bytes, this RS1 algorithm is more efficient thanthe OTP algorithm because it is simply shorter. It is readily apparentto those of ordinary skill in the art that a wide variety of encryptionmethods or algorithms are suitable for use in the present invention,including, but not limited to RS1, OTP, RC4™, Triple DES and AES.

[0379] There are major advantages provided by the data security methodsand computer systems of the present invention over traditionalencryption methods. One advantage is the security gained from movingshares of the data to different locations on one or more datadepositories or storage devices, that may be in different logical,physical or geographical locations. When the shares of data are splitphysically and under the control of different personnel, for example,the possibility of compromising the data is greatly reduced.

[0380] Another advantage provided by the methods and system of thepresent invention is the combination of the steps of the method of thepresent invention for securing data to provide a comprehensive processof maintaining security of sensitive data. The data is encrypted with asecure key and split into one or more shares, and in one embodiment,four shares, according to the secure key. The secure key is storedsafely with a reference pointer which is secured into four sharesaccording to a secure key. The data shares are then encryptedindividually and the keys are stored safely with different encryptedshares. When combined, the entire process for securing data according tothe methods disclosed herein becomes a comprehensive package for datasecurity.

[0381] The data secured according to the methods of the presentinvention is readily retrievable and restored, reconstituted,reassembled, decrypted, or otherwise returned into its original or othersuitable form for use. In order to restore the original data, thefollowing items may be utilized:

[0382] 1. All shares or portions of the data set.

[0383] 2. Knowledge of and ability to reproduce the process flow of themethod used to secure the data.

[0384] 3. Access to the session master key.

[0385] 4. Access to the Parser Master Key.

[0386] Therefore, it may be desirable to plan a secure installationwherein at least one of the above elements may be physically separatedfrom the remaining components of the system (under the control of adifferent system administrator for example).

[0387] Protection against a rogue application invoking the data securingmethods application may be enforced by use of the Parser Master Key. Amutual authentication handshake between the Secure Parser™ and theapplication may be required in this embodiment of the present inventionprior to any action taken.

[0388] The security of the system dictates that there be no “backdoor”method for recreation of the original data. For installations where datarecovery issues may arise, the Secure Parser™ can be enhanced to providea mirror of the four shares and session master key depository. Hardwareoptions such as RAID (redundant array of inexpensive disks, used tospread information over several disks) and software options such asreplication can assist as well in the data recovery planning.

[0389] Key Management

[0390] In one embodiment of the present invention, the data securingmethod uses three sets of keys for an encryption operation. Each set ofkeys may have individual key storage, retrieval, security and recoveryoptions, based on the installation. The keys that may be used, include,but are not limited to:

[0391] 1. The Parser Master Key

[0392] This key is an individual key associated with the installation ofthe data parser. It is installed on the server on which the parser hasbeen deployed. There are a variety of options suitable for securing thiskey including, but not limited to, a smart card, separate hardware keystore, standard key stores, custom key stores or within a secureddatabase table, for example.

[0393] 2. The Session Master Key

[0394] A Session Master Key may be generated each time data is secured.The Session Master Key is used to encrypt the data prior to the parsingoperation. It may also be incorporated (if the Session Master Key is notintegrated into the parsed data) as a means of parsing the encrypteddata. The Session Master Key may be secured in a variety of manners,including, but not limited to, a standard key store, custom key store,separate database table, or secured within the encrypted shares, forexample.

[0395] 3. The Share Encryption Keys

[0396] For each share or portions of a data set that is created, anindividual Share Encryption Key may be generated to further encrypt theshares. The Share Encryption Keys may be stored in different shares thanthe share that was encrypted.

[0397] It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art thatthe data securing methods and computer system of the present inventionare widely applicable to any type of data in any setting or environment.In addition to commercial applications conducted over the Internet orbetween customers and vendors, the data securing methods and computersystems of the present invention are highly applicable to non-commercialor private settings or environments. Any data set that is desired to bekept secure from any unauthorized user may be secured using the methodsand systems described herein. For example, access to a particulardatabase within a company or organization may be advantageouslyrestricted to only selected users by employing the methods and systemsof the present invention for securing data. Another example is thegeneration, modification or access to documents wherein it is desired torestrict access or prevent unauthorized or accidental access ordisclosure outside a group of selected individuals, computers orworkstations. These and other examples of the ways in which the methodsand systems of data securing of the present invention are applicable toany non-commercial or commercial environment or setting for any setting,including, but not limited to any organization, government agency orcorporation.

[0398] In another embodiment of the present invention, the data securingmethod uses three sets of keys for an encryption operation. Each set ofkeys may have individual key storage, retrieval, security and recoveryoptions, based on the installation. The keys that may be used, include,but are not limited to:

[0399] 1. The Parser Master Key

[0400] This key is an individual key associated with the installation ofthe data parser. It is installed on the server on which the parser hasbeen deployed. There are a variety of options suitable for securing thiskey including, but not limited to, a smart card, separate hardware keystore, standard key stores, custom key stores or within a secureddatabase table, for example.

[0401] 2. The Session Master Key

[0402] A Session Master Key may be generated each time data is secured.The Session Master Key is used in conjunction with the Parser Master keyto derive the Intermediary Key. The Session Master Key may be secured ina variety of manners, including, but not limited to, a standard keystore, custom key store, separate database table, or secured within theencrypted shares, for example.

[0403] 3. The Intermediary Key

[0404] An Intermediary Key may be generated each time data is secured.The. Intermediary Key is used to encrypt the data prior to the parsingoperation. It may also be incorporated as a means of parsing theencrypted data.

[0405] 4. The Share Encryption Keys

[0406] For each share or portions of a data set that is created, anindividual Share Encryption Key may be generated to further encrypt theshares. The Share Encryption Keys may be stored in different shares thanthe share that was encrypted.

[0407] It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art thatthe data securing methods and computer system of the present inventionare widely applicable to any type of data in any setting or environment.In addition to commercial applications conducted over the Internet orbetween customers and vendors, the data securing methods and computersystems of the present invention are highly applicable to non-commercialor private settings or environments. Any data set that is desired to bekept secure from any unauthorized user may be secured using the methodsand systems described herein. For example, access to a particulardatabase within a company or organization may be advantageouslyrestricted to only selected users by employing the methods and systemsof the present invention for securing data. Another example is thegeneration, modification or access to documents wherein it is desired torestrict access or prevent unauthorized or accidental access ordisclosure outside a group of selected individuals, computers orworkstations. These and other examples of the ways in which the methodsand systems of data securing of the present invention are applicable toany non-commercial or commercial environment or setting for any setting,including, but not limited to any organization, government agency orcorporation.

[0408] Workgroup, Project, Individual PC/Laptop or Cross Platform DataSecurity

[0409] The data securing methods and computer systems of the presentinvention are also useful in securing data by workgroup, project,individual PC/Laptop and any other platform that is in use in, forexample, businesses, offices, government agencies, or any setting inwhich sensitive data is created, handled or stored. The presentinvention provides methods and computer systems to secure data that isknown to be sought after by organizations, such as the U.S. Government,for implementation across the entire government organization or betweengovernments at a state or federal level.

[0410] The data securing methods and computer systems of the presentinvention provide the ability to not only parse flat files but also datafields, sets and or table of any type. Additionally, all forms of dataare capable of being secured under this process, including, but notlimited to, text, video, images, biometrics and voice data. Scalability,speed and data throughput of the methods of securing data of the presentinvention are only limited to the hardware the user has at theirdisposal.

[0411] In one embodiment of the present invention, the data securingmethods are utilized as described below in a workgroup environment. Inone embodiment, as shown in FIG. 23 and described below, the WorkgroupScale data securing method of the present invention uses the private keymanagement functionality of the TrustEngine to store the user/grouprelationships and the associated private keys (Parser Group Master Keys)necessary for a group of users to share secure data. The method of thepresent invention has the capability to secure data for an enterprise,workgroup, or individual user, depending on how the Parser Master Keywas deployed.

[0412] In one embodiment, additional key management and user/groupmanagement programs may be provided, enabling wide scale workgroupimplementation with a single point of administration and key management.Key generation, management and revocation are handled by the singlemaintenance program, which all become especially important as the numberof users increase. In another embodiment, key management may also be setup across one or several different system administrators, which may notallow any one person or group to control data as needed. This allows forthe management of secured data to be obtained by roles,responsibilities, membership, rights, etc., as defined by anorganization, and the access to secured data can be limited to justthose who are permitted or required to have access only to the portionthey are working on, while others, such as managers or executives, mayhave access to all of the secured data. This embodiment allows for thesharing of secured data among different groups within a company ororganization while at the same time only allowing certain selectedindividuals, such as those with the authorized and predetermined rolesand responsibilities, to observe the data as a whole. In addition, thisembodiment of the methods and systems of the present invention alsoallows for the sharing of data among, for example, separate companies,or separate departments or divisions of companies, or any separateorganization departments, groups, agencies, or offices, or the like, ofany government or organization or any kind, where some sharing isrequired, but not any one party may be permitted to have access to allthe data. Particularly apparent examples of the need and utility forsuch a method and system of the present invention are to allow sharing,but maintain security, in between government areas, agencies andoffices, and between different divisions, departments or offices of alarge company, or any other organization, for example.

[0413] An example of the applicability of the methods of the presentinvention on a smaller scale is as follows. A Parser Master key is usedas a serialization or branding of the Parser to an organization. As thescale of use of the Parser Master key is reduced from the wholeenterprise to a smaller workgroup, the data securing methods describedherein are used to share files within groups of users.

[0414] In the example shown in FIG. 25 and described below, there aresix users defined along with their title or role within theorganization. The side bar represents five possible groups that theusers can belong to according to their role. The arrow representsmembership by the user in one or more of the groups.

[0415] When configuring the SecureParser for use in this example, thesystem administrator accesses the user and group information from theoperating system by a maintenance program. This maintenance programgenerates and assigns Parser Group Master Keys to users based on theirmembership in groups.

[0416] In this example, there are three members in the Senior Staffgroup. For this group, the actions would be:

[0417] 1. Access Parser Group Master Key for the Senior Staff group(generate a key if not available);

[0418] 2. Generate a digital certificate associating CEO with the SeniorStaff group;

[0419] 3. Generate a digital certificate associating CFO with the SeniorStaff group;

[0420] 4. Generate a digital certificate associating Vice President,Marketing with the Senior Staff group.

[0421] The same set of actions would be done for each group, and eachmember within each group. When the maintenance program is complete, theParser Group Master Key becomes a shared credential for each member ofthe group. Revocation of the assigned digital certificate may be doneautomatically when a user is removed from a group through themaintenance program without affecting the remaining members of thegroup.

[0422] Once the shared credentials have been defined, the Parser processremains the same. When a file, document or data element is to besecured, the user is prompted for the target group to be used whensecuring the data. The resulting secured data is only accessible byother members of the target group. This functionality of the methods andsystems of the present invention may be used with any other computersystem or software platform, any may be, for example, integrated intoexisting application programs or used standalone for file security.

[0423] It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art thatany one or combination of encryption algorithms are suitable for use inthe methods and systems of the present invention. For example, theencryption steps may, in one embodiment, be repeated to produce amulti-layered encryption scheme. In addition, a different encryptionalgorithm, or combination of encryption algorithms, may be used inrepeat encryption steps such that different encryption algorithms areapplied to the different layers of the multi-layered encryption scheme.As such, the encryption scheme itself may become a component of themethods of the present invention for securing sensitive data fromunauthorized use or access.

[0424] Additionally, other combinations, admissions, substitutions andmodifications will be apparent to the skilled artisan in view of thedisclosure herein. Accordingly, the present invention is not intended tobe limited by the reaction of the preferred embodiments but is to bedefined by a reference to the appended claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method, comprising: a) encrypting a data set toprovide an encrypted data set; b) separating the encrypted data set intotwo or more portions of data; c) encrypting one or more of the portionsof data from step b); and d) storing the encrypted portions of data fromstep c) at one or more locations on one or more data depositories. 2.The method of claim 1, wherein the separating of step b) separates theencrypted data set into four or more portions of data.
 3. The method ofclaim 2, wherein step b) and step c) are repeated one or more timesbefore the storing of step d), and optionally, wherein the encrypting ofstep c) is performed using an encryption algorithm that is differentfrom the encryption algorithm in step a).
 4. The method of claim 1,wherein the storing of step d) is on different locations of the samedata depository.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the storing of stepd) is on different data depositories.
 6. The method of claim 1, whereinthe storing of step d) is on different data depositories in differentgeographic locations.
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the encryptionof step c) provides an encryption key, and wherein the encryption key isstored in step d) together with the data encrypted using said encryptionkey in step c).
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the encryption of stepc) provides an encryption key, and wherein the encryption key is storedin step d) separately from the data encrypted using said encryption keyin step c).
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein the data set of step a)comprises data selected from the group consisting of encryption keydata, text, video, audio, images, biometrics, and digital data.
 10. Amethod, comprising: a) separating a data set into two or more portionsof data; b) encrypting one or more of the portions of data of step a);and c) storing the one or more encrypted portions of data of step b) onone or more locations on one or more data depository.
 11. The method ofclaim 10, wherein the separating of step a) separates the data set intofour or more portions of data.
 12. The method of claim 10, wherein stepa) and step b) are repeated one or more times before the storing of stepc), and, optionally, wherein the encryption of step b) is repeated usinga different encryption algorithm.
 13. The method of claim 10, whereinthe storing of step c) is on different locations of the same datadepository.
 14. The method of claim 10, wherein the storing of step c)is on different data depositories.
 15. The method of claim 10, whereinthe storing of step c) is on different data depositories in differentgeographic locations.
 16. The method of claim 10, wherein the encryptionof step b) provides an encryption key, and wherein the encryption key isstored in step c) together with the data encrypted using said encryptionkey in step b).
 17. The method of claim 10, wherein the encryption ofstep b) provides an encryption key, and wherein the encryption key isstored in step c) separately from the data encrypted using saidencryption key in step b).
 18. The method of claim 10, wherein the dataset of step a) comprises data selected from a group consisting ofencryption key data, text, video, audio, images, biometrics, and digitaldata.
 19. The method of claim 10, wherein the encryption of step b) isperformed using an encryption algorithm selected from a group consistingof RS1, RC4™, and OTP.
 20. A method, comprising: a) generating anencryption master key and encrypting a data set using the encryptionmaster key; b) separating each of the encryption master key and theencrypted data set into two or more portions according to one separatingpattern and appending an encryption master key portion to an encrypteddata set portion; c) generating one or more encryption keys for theportions of data from step b) and encrypting said portions of data usingsaid encryption key; and d) storing the encrypted portions of data fromstep c) and the encryption keys from step c) on at least one datadepository.
 21. The method of claim 20, wherein the storing of encrypteddata portions in step d) is on two or more different locations of onedata depository.
 22. The method of claim 20, wherein the storing ofencrypted data portions in step d) is on two or more data depositories.23. The method of claim 20, wherein the storing of the encryption keysin step d) is on two or more different locations of one data depository.24. The method of claim 20, wherein the storing of the encryption keysof step d) is on two or more different data depositories.
 25. The methodof claim 20, wherein the encryption keys generated in step c) is storedaccording to step d) with the encrypted data of step c) on differentlocations on one or more data depository.
 26. The method of claim 20,wherein the encryption key generated in step c) is stored according tostep d) on a different data depository from the encrypted data of stepc) that was encrypted using said encryption key.
 27. The method of claim20, wherein the encrypted data of step b) is separated into four or moreportions.
 28. The method of claim 20, wherein the encryption master keyof step b) is separated into four or more portions.
 29. The method ofclaim 20, wherein step b) and step c) are repeated one or more times,and optionally, wherein the encrypting of step c) is performed using anencryption algorithm that is different from the encryption algorithmused in step a).
 30. A method, comprising: a) generating an encryptionmaster key and encrypting a data set using the encryption master key; b)separating each of the encryption master key and the encrypted data setinto two or more portions according to one separating pattern andstoring the encryption master key portions on one or more locations ofone or more data depositories; c) generating one or more encryption keysfor the encrypted data set portions of step b) and encrypting saidportions of data using said encryption key; and d) storing the encryptedportions from step c) and the encryption keys from step c) on at leastone location of at least one data depository, wherein said datadepositories are different from the data depositories of step b). 31.The method of claim 30, wherein the storing of encrypted data portionsin step d) is on two or more different locations of one data depository.32. The method of claim 30, wherein the storing of encrypted dataportions in step d) is on two or more data depositories.
 33. The methodof claim 30, wherein the storing of the encryption keys in step d) is ontwo or more different locations of one data depository.
 34. The methodof claim 30, wherein the storing of the encryption keys of step d) is ontwo or more different data depositories.
 35. The method of claim 30,wherein the encryption keys generated in step c) and used to encrypt adata set in step c) is stored according to step d) with the encrypteddata set that was encrypted using the encryption key on one or more datadepositories.
 36. The method of claim 30, wherein the encryption keygenerated in step c) and used to encrypt a data set in step c) is storedaccording to step d) in a different location on one or more datadepositories from the encrypted data set that was encrypted using theencryption key.
 37. The method of claim 30, wherein the encrypted dataof step b) is separated into four or more portions.
 38. The method ofclaim 30, wherein the encryption master key of step b) is separated intofour or more portions.
 39. The method of claim 30, wherein step b) andstep c) are repeated one or more times, and optionally, wherein theencrypting of step c) is performed using an encryption algorithm that isdifferent from the encryption algorithm used in step a).
 40. A system,comprising: a) a data splitting module; b) a cryptographic handlingmodule; and c) a data assembling module.
 41. The system of claim 40,wherein said data splitting module separates data into two or moreportions.
 42. The system of claim 40, wherein said cryptographichandling module operates on data prior to of after said data is operatedon by the data splitting module, and performs encryption of the data.43. The system of claim 40, wherein said data assembling module operateson data that has been operated on by the data splitting module or thecryptographic module to restore said data to its original form.
 44. Amethod, comprising: a) encrypting a data set to provide an encrypteddata set; b) separating the encrypted data set into two or more portionsof data according to the contents of a unique key value; c) encryptingone or more of the portions of data from step b); and d) storing theencrypted portions of data from step c) at one or more locations on oneor more data depositories.
 45. The method of claim 44, wherein theseparating of step b) separates the encrypted data set into four or moreportions of data according to the contents of a unique key value. 46.The method of claim 45, wherein step b) and step c) are repeated one ormore times before the storing of step d), and optionally, wherein theencrypting of step c) is performed using an encryption algorithm that isdifferent from the encryption algorithm in step a).
 47. The method ofclaim 44, wherein the storing of step d) is on different locations ofthe same data depository.
 48. The method of claim 44, wherein thestoring of step d) is on different data depositories.
 49. The method ofclaim 44, wherein the storing of step d) is on different datadepositories in different geographic locations.
 50. The method of claim44, wherein the encryption of step c) provides an encryption key, andwherein the encryption key is stored in step d) together with the dataencrypted using said encryption key in step c).
 51. The method of claim44, wherein the encryption of step c) provides an encryption key, andwherein the encryption key is stored in step d) separately from the dataencrypted using said encryption key in step c).
 52. The method of claim44, wherein the data set of step a) comprises data selected from thegroup consisting of encryption key data, text, video, audio, images,biometrics, and digital data.
 53. The method of claim 44 wherein saidportions of data comprise one or more bits of data.
 54. A method,comprising: a) splitting a data set into N number of data units; b)selecting X number of shares for data unit storage; c) generating Nnumber of random numbers that correspond to the X number of shares; d)assigning the random numbers to the data units; and e) storing the dataunits and the random number in the share that corresponds to the randomnumber.
 55. The method of claim 54, wherein said data units comprise atleast one bit.
 56. A system, comprising: a) a data splitting module; b)a cryptographic handling module; and c) a data assembling module,wherein said system performs the method of claim
 1. 57. A system,comprising: a) a data splitting module; b) a cryptographic handlingmodule; and c) a data assembling module, wherein said system performsthe method of claim 1, and optionally, wherein the encrypting of step c)is performed using an encryption algorithm that is different from theencryption algorithm used in step a).
 58. A system, comprising: a) adata splitting module; b) a cryptographic handling module; and c) a dataassembling module, wherein said system performs the method of claim 10.59. A system, comprising: a) a data splitting module; b) a cryptographichandling module; and c) a data assembling module, wherein said systemperforms the method of claim 10, and optionally, wherein the encryptingof step c) is performed using an encryption algorithm that is differentfrom the encryption algorithm used in step a).
 60. A system, comprising:a) a data splitting module; b) a cryptographic handling module; and c) adata assembling module, wherein said system performs the method of claim20.
 61. A system, comprising: a) a data splitting module; b) acryptographic handling module; and c) a data assembling module, whereinsaid system performs the method of claim 20, and optionally, wherein theencrypting of step c) is performed using an encryption algorithm that isdifferent from the encryption algorithm used in step a).
 62. A system,comprising: a) a data splitting module; b) a cryptographic handlingmodule; and c) a data assembling module, wherein said system performsthe method of claim
 30. 63. A system, comprising: a) a data splittingmodule; b) a cryptographic handling module; and c) a data assemblingmodule, wherein said system performs the method of claim 30, andoptionally, wherein the encrypting of step c) is performed using anencryption algorithm that is different from the encryption algorithmused in step a).
 64. A system, comprising: a) a data splitting module;b) a cryptographic handling module; and c) a data assembling module,wherein said system performs the method of claim
 44. 65. A system,comprising: a) a data splitting module; b) a cryptographic handlingmodule; and c) a data assembling module, wherein said system performsthe method of claim 44, and optionally, wherein the encrypting of stepc) is performed using an encryption algorithm that is different from theencryption algorithm used in step a).
 66. A system, comprising: a) adata splitting module; b) a cryptographic handling module; and c) a dataassembling module, wherein said system performs the method of claim 54.67. A system, comprising: a) a data splitting module; b) a cryptographichandling module; and c) a data assembling module, wherein said systemperforms the method of claim 54, and optionally, wherein the encryptingof step c) is performed using an encryption algorithm that is differentfrom the encryption algorithm used in step a).